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ABSTRACT 
A military weapon is any tool used to increase the reach or power of a nation. 
Simply, it can be said that each era witnesses the deployment of new and powerful mass 
destruction weaponry. What will this century’s most powerful weapon be? Directed-
energy weapons, which offer advantages over conventional weapons by providing attack 
at the speed of light, precise targeting, rapid engagement of multiple targets, adjustable 
damage capacity, low operational cost, reduced logistic support, a nearly unlimited 
magazine, and wide area coverage for offensive and defensive purposes, seem to be at the 
forefront of the next revolution in military weapons. 
This thesis provides an understanding of the principles and techniques of directed-
energy weapons. In addition, key directed-energy weapon (DEW) programs in laser 
weapons and RF directed-energy weapons (high-power microwaves) will be fully 
described, as well as a providing comparison of these DEW types from a military utility 
perspective. Last but not least, this study will assist in establishing a vision for how 
directed-energy weapons could revolutionize military affairs in the Turkish Armed 
Forces of the future. 
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Consider a hypothetical scenario in which two countries are in conflict. Well 
aware of the value of asymmetric weapons, one country begins investigating directed-
energy (DE) weapons and equips its armed forces with these weapons.  In the event of an 
unwanted war, for defensive protection they intend to use high-power microwave (HPM) 
sources to disrupt the other’s stealth aircraft, which are potentially more susceptible due 
to their wave-absorbing nature. Moreover, they plan to protect fighter aircraft with free 
electron laser (FEL) cannons against incoming missiles and shoot down the other’s 
rockets and artillery fire with tactical high-energy laser (THEL) from the arsenal of a 
multi-platform, multi-mission, defense system.  
For offensive applications, this DE conscious nation suppresses the other’s air 
defense and command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) 
facilities with unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) loaded with radio frequency (RF) weapon 
payloads. Using a modularized sealed exhaust chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL), they 
can disable the other’s domestic critical infrastructure, transportation and 
communications systems with advanced tactical laser (ATL). In addition, agents use 
transient electromagnetic devices (TED) to cause detrimental effects on infrastructure 
such as financial institutions (i.e., banks, ATMs, and stores), airport facilities, and other 
critical entities.  
The second country underestimates directed-energy weapon attacks by 
prioritizing conventional fighters and cruise missiles against their enemy’s defenses.  
With the unique role of directed-energy weapons’ combination of rapid reaction times, 
long ranges and speed-of-light engagement, unlimited magazine and precision, this 
second nation is susceptible to DE weapon attacks that can destroy these aircraft and 
missile systems. The high-power microwave signals from the DE equipped adversary’s 
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installations cause over ninety percent of cruise missiles to fail en route to their targets. 
Following a DE equipped nation attack with an E-bomb, airborne laser (ABL), and/or 
advanced tactical lasers, there is little left of this second country’s ground facilities and 
airborne defense systems, with the added condition that minimal collateral damage 
resulted from the DE-equipped country’s attack. 
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
Warfare is largely unwanted, but often unavoidable. Under the shadow of this 
reality, innovations in technology and the application of that technology to military 
operations combine to provide an opportunity to gain military advantage.1 The rate of 
technological change in communications, computers, sensors, lasers and radio frequency 
weaponry is influencing and increasing the complexity of modern warfare.  
Military communities have known of the detrimental effects of radio frequency 
energy on electronics since World War I. Incisive applications of electronic devices on 
military weapon and support systems are making the directed-energy weaponry approach 
the most promising weapons in the twenty-first century.   
This study addresses what directed-energy (DE) weapons are, provides an 
understanding of the two basic types of directed-energy weapons, and offers a 
comparison of these two basic types.  The thesis also examines why the Turkish Armed 
Forces should integrate directed-energy weapons into its force structure and how the 
Turkish Armed Forces could improve combat capabilities by using these weapons. This 
research will lead to more effective planning of directed-energy weapons usage for 




                                                 
1 Army and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies and 
Lincoln 2004, 1. 
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B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study researches the answers to the following questions: 
Primary Question 
• How can the Turkish Armed Forces use directed-energy weapons to 
improve its combat capabilities in the twenty-first century?  
Subsidiary Questions 
• What is directed energy and directed-energy weapons? 
• What is soft-kill and hard-kill? 
• What are the different types of directed-energy weapons? 
• Why directed-energy weapons? 
• What are the types of laser weapons? 
• What is a ground-based laser? 
• What is an airborne laser? 
• What is a space-based laser? 
• What are laser countermeasures? 
• What are the structure and characteristic properties of high-power 
microwave weapons (HPMWs)? 
• What are the applications and targets? 
• What are the protective methods? 
• What is the relationship between electronic warfare (EW) and directed-
energy weapons? 
• How can one compare laser and high-power microwave weapons? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of each type of directed-
energy weapon in general, and for the Turkish Armed Forces specifically? 
• Why should the Turkish Armed Forces consider integrating directed-
energy weapons into their force structure? 
• What might be the offensive and defensive utilization of directed-energy 






C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Recent advances in technologies have made the development of directed-energy 
weapons technically feasible. After the third quarter of the last century, scientists have 
offered many logical and convincing explanations about why directed-energy weapons 
will be so dominant throughout the coming years.  
Although early documents categorize particle beams as DE weapons, later studies 
just examine laser and high-power microwaves under the DE umbrella, and do not 
include particle beams in the discussion. 
All the sources found in academic journals highlight the importance of directed-
energy weapons and how they will change the battle space perspective of future wars. 
While some sources present these weapons simply as reflections of technological 
improvements, other researchers offer more complicated and technical discussions. 
Most current scientific studies discuss just one type of directed-energy weapon 
and at this point in time do not include military applications in the discussion. Military 
writings mostly view these weapons with just only one service branch’s point of view - 
Army, Navy or Air Force. 
This thesis does not attempt to explain all types of directed-energy weapons, but 
instead presents their military applications for a nation’s service branches (Army, Navy, 
and Air Force jointly). In summary, like other sources, this study concludes that directed-
energy weapons technology has made sufficient progress in the last decades and countries 
that underestimate the asymmetric advantages of these weapons will find themselves at 
risk. 
Further examination should be conducted on modeling and simulation tools as 
well as scenarios to improve the operational effectiveness of directed-energy weapons 
among real users. Additionally, self-defense and countermeasures against directed-energy 




D. IMPORTANCE AND THE BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
Although this subject is very scientific and electronic warfare-focused, this thesis 
explains things simply and clearly with figures, graphs and tables so readers with little 
knowledge of the basic science will have little trouble understanding the principles 
behind directed-energy weapons. The reason for this approach is that the study is 
intended to be easily understood by non-engineers and other non-technical individuals 
with little or no electronic warfare (EW) training, education, or background. By adopting 
this approach, the author hopes to broaden the number of targeted readers. 
The results of this thesis may be used to support ongoing efforts by the Turkish 
Armed Forces to apply electronic warfare against modern threats. This study should 
enhance the perspective and knowledge of electronic warfare officers, related project 
officers and technical personnel. Furthermore, research and results will assist the Turkish 
Armed Forces in evaluating future needs and requirements of electronic warfare systems. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is composed of eight chapters. Chapter I provides an introduction to, 
and an overview of, directed-energy weapons by using an imaginary war scenario. 
Chapter II presents the fundamental terminology before entering the high-power 
microwave and laser discussions, and provides the historical background for directed-
energy weapons. Besides giving the definitions in order to understand directed energy 
and directed-energy weapons clearly, particle beams will be explained in this chapter. 
Current applications and countries working on directed-energy weapons will also be 
discussed. 
Chapter III explains how lasers work and function within the atmosphere. Laser 
types and technologies are summarized. Well-known high-energy laser weapon systems, 
such as ground-based lasers, airborne lasers and space-based lasers, will be explained and 
demonstrated with figures, as in Figure 1. As a protective technique, laser 
countermeasures will be reviewed.  
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Figure 1.   Directed-Energy Weapons on Different Platforms2 
 
Chapter IV explains the structure and characteristics of high-power microwave 
weapons. High-power microwave lethality and the methods used to affect targets will be 
explained. Furthermore, potential targets and applications of high-power microwave 
weapons will be examined. This chapter also illustrates and discusses the relationship 
between electronic warfare and high-power microwave weapons. 
Chapter V analyzes and compares the advantages and disadvantages of the two 
basic forms (laser and high-power microwave) of directed-energy weapons. 
Chapter VI illustrates present and near future directed-energy devices from 
different countries in this area, along with figures.  
Chapter VII answers the primary research question of how can the Turkish Armed 
Forces use directed-energy weapons to improve its combat capabilities in the twenty-first 
century. 
Chapter VIII presents the conclusion and the recommendation of the study. Figure 
2 shows the outline of the thesis. 
 
 
                                                 









Figure 2.   Thesis Roadmap 
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II. TERMINOLOGY AND DE WEAPONRY BASICS 
It is still a matter of wonder how the Martians are able to slay men so 
swiftly and so silently. Many think that in some way they are able to 
generate an intense heat in a chamber of practically absolute non-
conductivity. This intense heat they project in a parallel beam against any 
object they choose, by means of a polished parabolic mirror of unknown 
composition, much as the parabolic mirror of a lighthouse projects a beam 
of light. But no one has absolutely proved these details. However, it is 
done, it is certain that a beam of heat is the essence of the matter. Heat, 
and invisible, instead of visible, light. Whatever is combustible flashes 
into flame at its touch, lead runs like water, it softens iron, cracks and 
melts glass, and when it falls upon water, incontinently that explodes into 
steam.3 
A. BACKGROUND 
Archimedes is said to have invented burning mirrors, turning them on ships to set 
them afire and helping defend his hometown of Syracuse when the Romans invaded in 
214 BC.4  In the fifteenth century this scenario was painted by an Italian painter as shown 
in Figure 3. Later, in 1898 H.G. Wells used a directed-energy death-ray or heat-ray in his 
novel “The War of the Worlds.” 
 
Figure 3.   Archimedes’s Burning Mirror5 
                                                 
3 Wells 1898, 35. 
4 Sforza and Zmuda 2003, 1. 
5 From Beason 2005. 
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In 1861, Scottish physicist James Clark Maxwell proposed that the oscillation of 
an electric charge produced an electromagnetic field moving outward from its source at a 
constant speed, which demonstrated the connection between magnetism and electricity. A 
German scientist, Heinrich Rudolf Hertz, considered an electromagnetic wave to be a 
potential source that could be used to provide power and verified Maxwell’s ideas. 
Maxwell’s four equations describe the propagation and interaction known as 
electromagnetic radiation. An electromagnetic spectrum shows the different kinds of 
radiation, arranging them according to their frequency or wavelength, and includes radio 
waves, microwaves, infrared, visible and ultraviolet light, x-rays and gamma rays. 
Prior to and during World War II, Albert Einstein’s studies showed that atoms 
could absorb and emit radiation spontaneously, and in certain excited states, emit 
radiation. This discovery, which he named stimulated emission of radiation, allowed 
other scientists to advance on the path toward the laser (Light Amplification by the 
Stimulated Emission of Radiation). Einstein’s discovery provided the basic foundation 
for the development of lasers, and this discovery opened an extensive array of military 
applications. 
Before World War II, it was assumed that electromagnetic waves could be used to 
destroy airplanes. As a coincidental result of further studies, the radio for detection and 
ranging (radar) was discovered.6 
The modern quest for effectively using electromagnetic energy for defense 
applications probably began around 1935, when the British Admiralty is said to have 
petitioned Sir Robert Watson-Watt to investigate the possibility of using a radar-like 
device to boil a pilot’s blood.7 Early in World War II, British radar experts came up with 
an idea of developing a "super- interferometer," which could transmit microwaves intense 
enough to destroy enemy electronic networks.8 
                                                 
6 Guoqi Ni, Benqing Gao, and Junwei Lu 2005, 1. 
7 Sforza and Zmuda 2003, 1. 
8 National Air Intelligence Center Wright-Patterson AFB OH, Li, and Wang 1996, 3. 
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The first ruby solid-state laser was developed in 1960 at the Hughes Aircraft 
Corporation laboratory in California. Since its first invention, the laser has proven to be 
an extremely useful device for the military. 
During the same time, high-power microwave technology has progressed. Soviet 
Union scientists were probably the first to successfully develop an HPM weapon, and 
were far ahead of other countries on the research of the source of HPMs. In 1979, they 
achieved a breakthrough in manufacturing an experimental gigawatt-level microwave 
emission triode, a device critical to controlling the extremely high power levels needed in 
microwave beam technology. Before its collapse, the Soviet Union had a large and 
diverse radio frequency (RF) weapons program and remnants of this work continue today 
within former Soviet countries.9 However, the U.S. has caught up and now leads all 
competition in this field. 
In the 1980s, directed-energy (DE) weapons became more attractive for 
countering intercontinental ballistic missiles, with their lethal power projected against 
distant targets at nearly instantaneous speeds, and most importantly, by them not being 
adversely affected by gravity or atmospheric drag. The aim was to intercept and destroy 
strategic ballistic missiles before they reached their targets. This was not possible with 
the properties and state of kinetic energy weapons. 
Every year seemed to bring important inventions in this field. In the last two 
decades, the capacity of these weapons has been proven. After years of investment, high-
energy laser (HEL) weapons and RF weapons have reached laboratory maturity and are 
ready for military use. The coming era will witness these weapons in the theaters of war. 
B. BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS 
For the purposes of this paper, the technical details of directed-energy (DE) 
weapons would add little value, but terminology is important to an understanding of how 
lasers and microwaves are different parts of essentially the same thing. 
                                                 
9 Air War College Maxwell AFB AL Brunderman 1999, 8. 
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Directed-energy weapons irradiate the target with electromagnetic energy. This 
makes these devices unique in the field of military weapons. 
Electromagnetic energy is referred to as an electromagnetic wave because this 
energy repeats itself in a predictable manner over time and shares the same propagation 
properties as light. The time for a periodic signal to repeat itself is known as the period of 
the wave and the inversion of a wave’s period is known as its frequency ( 1/=T v ). 
Frequency is measured as the number of vibrations per second and expressed in Hertz 
(Hz) in honor of Heinrich Rudolf Hertz. By common convention, wavelength, period, 
frequency, and the speed of light are denoted by the symbols λ , T, ν, and c 
respectively.10 The speed of light is a constant, and in a vacuum, it always travels at a 
speed of 299,792,458 meters per second, no matter how its speed is measured. 
Mathematically, the relationship among these quantities is  
λ = c
v
                                                           (2.1) 
or with the period 
λ = ⋅c T                                                           (2.2) 
Consequently, if the wavelength is known, frequency or period can be determined. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between frequency and wavelength.  
 
Figure 4.   Electromagnetic Spectrum11 
                                                 
10 Nielsen and National Defense University Press 1994, 83. 
11 From NASA 2006. 
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Although electricity and magnetism can be described as waves, another equally 
correct interpretation is to describe them as tiny, quantized packets of energy known as 
photons. The only difference between lasers and high-power microwaves, which are both 
made up of photons, is their energy level. In units of joules (named after James Prescott 
Joule) photon energy (E) is a function of frequency, and mathematically the relationship 
among these quantities is  
= ⋅E h v                                                        (2.3) 
λ
⋅= h cE                                                        (2.4) 
where h is a Planck’s constant (named after Max Karl Planck) equal to 6,625 x 10-34 Joule 
seconds.12  
The basic function of a directed-energy weapon is to place sufficient fluence on a 
target (joules per square centimeter J/cm²) or irradiance (watts per square centimeter 
watts/cm²) to inflict lethal damage or disruption to critical components.13 The energy 
delivered to a target is determined by the following equation:   
P t LF
A
⋅∆ ⋅=                                                    (2.5) 
Fluence (F) is the energy deposited in joules per square centimeter (J/cm²); P is 
the directed-energy weapon’s output power in watts (or Joules per second); ∆t is the 
duration of the directed-energy weapons pulse in seconds; L is a dimensionless 
transmission number which delineates the percentage of the directed-energy weapons 
output that actually reaches the target (often called the Strehl number); and A is the DE 
weapon’s effective spot size on the target. For example, to destroy soft targets (i.e., 
fabrics, plastics, etc...) approximately 1000 J/cm² are required. Extremely hard targets 
such as tanks might require 100,000 J/cm².14 Once the target has absorbed this energy, it 
will begin to heat up. 
                                                 
12 Beason 2005, 28. 
13 Scientific Advisory Board (Air Force) Washington DC 1995, vii. 
14 Geis and Air University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology 2003, 5. 
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Overall, directed energy and directed-energy weapons are a part of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, where microwaves have significantly longer wavelengths with 
lower frequencies than lasers. With their adjustable power and fluence capacity, instead 
of permanent hard-kill damage, directed-energy weapons are the new threat to highly 
sophisticated military systems.   
C. WHAT IS DIRECTED ENERGY (DE) AND DIRECTED-ENERGY 
WEAPONS? 
1. Key Definitions 
Understanding the following important terms helps to better discuss the issues 
within later chapters. 
Directed Energy (DE): An umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the 
production of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic 
particles (Joint Publication 1-02, 161). 
Directed-Energy Device: A system using directed energy primarily for a purpose 
other than as a weapon. Directed-energy devices may produce effects that could allow the 
device to be used as a weapon against certain threats; for example, laser rangefinders and 
designators used against sensors that are sensitive to light (Joint Publication 1-02, 161). 
Directed-Energy Warfare: Military action involving the use of directed-energy 
weapons, devices, and countermeasures to either cause direct damage or destruction of 
enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel, or to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent 
hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum through damage, destruction, and disruption. 
It also includes actions taken to protect friendly equipment, facilities, and personnel, as 
well as retain friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum (Joint Publication 1-02, 161). 
Directed-Energy Weapon: A system using directed energy primarily as a direct 
means to damage or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel (Joint Publication 
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1-02, 162). DEWs are a class of weapons whose intent is to disrupt, disable, and/or 
destroy an adversary’s device or system by means of some intense electromagnetic (EM) 
environment.15 
2. Directed-Energy Weapon Systems 
Directed-energy weapons can be divided into the following three categories;  
• Lasers, which excite atoms to release photons in powerful bursts of 
coherent light 
• High-power microwave (HPM)/radio frequency (RF) weapons, 
which radiate electromagnetic energy in the high RF spectrum 
• Particle beam devices, which use large numbers of atomic or sub-
atomic particles moving at relativistic velocities approaching that 
of light 
a. Particle Beam Dilemma 
Particle beam weapons are the least mature of the three directed-energy 
weapon technologies and receive by far the least amount of research effort. Actually, 
since they are almost only capable of hard-kills and deliver kinetic energy into the 
target’s atomic structure and they do not direct electromagnetic waves like lasers or high-
power microwaves, particle beam weapons are not true directed-energy weapons. 
There are two types of particle beam weapons: charged-particle beam 
weapons and neutral-particle beam weapons. A charged-particle beam (CPB) is made up 
of particles such as electrons, protons or heavy ions which possess an electrical charge. A 
neutral-particle beam (NPB) is made up of particles such as atomic hydrogen, deuterium 
or tritium that are electrically neutral. Neutral-particle beams interact very strongly with 
matter, therefore interactions with intervening gas makes the propagation of NPB through 
the atmosphere impractical. They are also limited to altitudes above 100 km. Charged-
particle beams propagate only in the atmosphere (endoatmospheric) at altitudes less than 
about 200 km. 
 
                                                 
15 Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Div Frazier 2000, 5. 
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To form a NPB, hydrogen or deuterium gas is subjected to an enormous 
electrical charge that ionizes the gas molecules, and the ions are then accelerated down a 
long vacuum tunnel by an electric field of hundreds of megavolts. At the end of the 
tunnel, electrons are stripped from the ions. This results in a beam of neutral particles that 
shoots toward the target. 16 
NPB weapons deliver kinetic energy into the target’s atomic structure. At 
low power, this kinetic energy produces electronic upset that disrupts the electronic 
circuits; at higher power, this produces burnout damage, which destroys sensitive 
electronics.  




All weather capability Altitude limitations 
Beam penetration Complicated beam control 
Beam velocity Huge power supply 
Rapid aim capability Line-of-sight (LOS) device 























 Size and weight Problems 
Table 1.   Advantages and Disadvantages of PB Weapons 
 
                                                 
16 Bolkcom and Tatman 1997, 7. 
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Due to the disadvantages shown in Table 1, such as weight, size, and 
power challenges, particle-beam weapons are not considered as feasible weapons in the 
coming decades. Today, and in the decades to come, directed energy is generally focused 
on lasers and microwaves. The next two chapters will explain and illustrate these two 
categories of directed-energy weapons in detail.  
b. Developments and Current Applications 
In recent years, technological developments in microelectronics have 
made integrated circuits and super high-speed circuitry widely used in today’s high 
precision and extremely accurate weapons systems. These systems produce sophisticated, 
smart, stealthy, compact and intelligent weapons.  
Since kinetic energy weapons are no longer capable of fully dealing with 
these types of complex electronic equipment and advanced technologies, it is necessary 
to develop a new generation of weapons. This emergence has been driven by or affected 
by at least the following three factors: 
• Increased application of automated electronic systems in military 
and civilian operations, 
• Increased use of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
• After more than twenty years of effort, an understanding of the 
susceptibilities of both military and commercial systems to 
directed-energy weapons is maturing.17 
Major innovations have been made in the form of improved laser 
materials, high-power microwave sources, antennas, sensors, optical materials, and many 
engineering areas related to directed-energy weapons.  The technology needed to 
implement these weapons in a compact size for integration on combat platforms was 
absent at the end of the last century, but directed-energy weapons technology has 
advanced vastly and is now maturing rapidly.18 
 
                                                 
17 Sforza and Zmuda 2003, 49. 
18 Scientific Advisory Board (Air Force) Washington DC 1995, v. 
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Different countries have focused on the investigation of directed-energy 
weapons. In reviewing the published literature, the United States is clearly the leader in 
this science, with China, Russia, Ukraine, Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel, 
Australia, and France advancing in the field, while Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, 
Pakistan, and India are emerging powers.19 20 21 
Table 2 (which was derived from the three previous reference sources) 
identifies the countries that are investigating, developing, or producing directed-energy 




Major United States 
Medium-Scale China, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, Ukraine, Russia 
Emerging Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Pakistan, India 
Table 2.   Directed-Energy Weapon Developing Countries 
 
The significance of directed-energy weapons is that they provide a range 
of strategic and operational capabilities in both offensive and defensive military 
operations. Basic strategic and operational offensive applications are: 
• Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) 
• Attack against ground, air and maritime targets 
• Electronic suppression and disablement of command, 
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 
systems 
• Close air support (CAS) 
                                                 
19 Air War College Maxwell AFB AL Brunderman 1999, 23. 
20 United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee 1998. 
21 Sforza and Zmuda 2003, 49. 
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• Battlefield air interdiction 
• Space control and anti-satellite operations 
• Suppressing or damaging visible, infrared, and microwave 
sensors 
• Asymmetric strikes 
• Dispersion of crowds, rioters (non-lethal anti-personnel 
attacks) 
•  Speedboat pursuit 
Basic strategic and operational defensive applications are: 
• Ballistic missile (BM) and surface-to-air missile defense 
• Counter-artillery and rockets 
• Air defense 
• Counter-electronics against targeting and sensor systems 
• Fleet defense 
• Aircraft self-protection 
• Protection of armored vehicles  
• Neutralization of explosive traps and minefield cleaning 
• Critical infrastructure protection 
• Stopping of motor vehicles 
• Surveillance of coastal waters 
The host platforms can be ships, large or tactical aircraft that include 
helicopters, ground vehicles, ground bases and spacecraft. Directed-energy weapons have 
passed the stages of laboratory prototypes and even trial production for some 
applications. There is no doubt that they will become a major force multiplier due to their 
significant advantages over traditional kinetic weapons (see Table 3).  
D. WHY DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS? 
To reach deployment, a new weapon system must either show significant 
capability or cost advantages over existing systems or address a priority 
requirement that cannot be met by incremental improvements to an 
existing system. 22 
 
 
                                                 
22 National Defense University Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy 
and Zimet 2002, 3. 
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1. Advantages of Directed-Energy Weapons 
There are several reasons for the growing interest in directed-energy weapons.  
The attraction of the military to these weapons is clear when considering the unique 
properties they bring to the strategic, operational, and tactical battlefield.  
The first and most obvious advantage is that directed-energy weapons deliver 
lethal energy at the speed of light. This significant advantage enables instant reaction to 
fast, highly maneuverable targets. That means many of the problems associated with 
aiming and discharging existing weapons are effectively eliminated, because virtually no 
time elapses between firing a directed-energy weapon and its impact on the target. 23 
Avoidance of collateral damage or adjustable energy is the second advantage of 
directed-energy weapons. Today’s war mentality prefers the option to inflict non-lethal 
attacks prior to the use of lethal force. In contrast to kinetic and chemical weapons that 
might have devastating and unintended collateral effects, flexible engagement levels 
dependent upon the transmitted power and irradiation time makes the DE weapons 
unique and valuable. 
A third important aspect of the directed-energy weapons is that they are extremely 
precise. Directed-energy weapons allow the attackers employing them to select the 
specific part of a fast-moving target that they wish to strike. In fact, with sufficient 
tracking and characterization, this unprecedented precision will accomplish surgical 
strikes with no collateral damage or fratricidal effects on friendly forces. 24 
A fourth important feature of directed-energy weapons is their freedom from 
gravitational limits. Directed-energy beams are essentially immune to gravity due to their 
lack of mass, which also frees them from the kinematic and aerodynamic constraints that 
limit traditional weapons.25 
                                                 
23 Thompson 2002. 
24 Thompson and Goure 2003, 5. 
25 Spencer, Carafano, and Heritage Foundation (Washington, D.C.) 2004, 4. 
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A fifth key feature of the directed-energy weapons is that they are area weapons 
that can engage multiple targets within a hostile area with minimal prior information on 
threat characteristics. They can affect all targets in that area and can be rapidly retargeted 
to provide protection in several directions.26  
A sixth directed-energy weapon advantage is their deep magazines, which need 
only fuel and battery chargers, as well as low operating costs. For example, a tactical 
high-energy laser shot is estimated to cost about $8,000, whereas firing a Patriot (PAC-3) 
missile costs $3.8 million; an AIM-7 Sparrow missile costs approximately $125,000; and 
a Tomahawk cruise missile costs roughly $600,000. Although the beam-generating 
system may be expensive to build and maintain, the price of engagements is minimal 
because the system expends only energy. 27 
A final unique characteristic of directed-energy weapon is their all-weather attack 
capability to reach virtually untouchable targets. They are unaffected by weather and can 
penetrate deep into the earth, enabling attacks on buried bunkers, as well as targets in 
space. 28 
2. Limitations and Problems with Directed-Energy Weapons 
Directed-energy weapons offer new ways of fighting that will change current 
doctrines, tactics, and strategies. As with the introduction of any new systems, directed-
energy weapons also have limitations and drawbacks that will tend to mitigate their fast 
growth. 
The first problem facing directed energy is operating under real-world conditions. 
While a new technology like directed-energy weapons are being transitioned out of the 
laboratory to the real battlegrounds, there might be relatively simple countermeasures that 
can restrict the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons that have been overlooked by 
those working in the laboratories and that may be relatively simple to implement.  
                                                 
26 Air Univ Press Maxwell AFB AL and Walling 2000, 14. 
27 Spencer, Carafano, and Heritage Foundation (Washington, D.C.) 2004, 4. 
28 Naval War Coll Newport RI Joint Military Operations DEPT and Jersey 2003. 
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Fratricide is probably the second biggest drawback in using this technology. Some 
directed-energy weapons are not very discriminating. Radiating at an enemy will not only 
affect the target system, but also anything else in the beam’s path. Any friendly forces 
within the footprint of the beam will be at significant risk.29 
A third great limitation of some types of directed-energy weapons is that they are 
highly susceptible to degradation by the atmosphere in the presence of obscurants, 
whether natural or manufactured, such as dust, clouds, rain and smoke.  
Another potential limitation is damage or performance-degrading assessments. 
Due to little directly-observable feedback from the target as to the effects of a hit, one 
may not know positively if a directed-energy weapon has been successful.30 
The last concern regarding directed-energy weapons is related to their usage 
against allied forces. High-powered microwave weapons may be relatively simple for 
terrorist forces (and others) to acquire and use in an asymmetric manner. In order to 
counter this, all electronic platforms and weapon systems must be hardened and shielded. 
Table 3 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of directed-energy weapons.  
Like their strengths, directed-energy weapons weaknesses differ from those 
encountered by current technologies and contribute to the impression that these weapons 
are very different. Like all other weapons, directed-energy weapons have limitations and 
problems. However, their potential influence on the current battlefield strategies far 






                                                 
29 Air War Coll Maxwell AFB AL and Brunderman 1999, 20. 
30 Bayer 1986, 46. 
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Advantages Disadvantages 
Adjustable damage capacity Atmospheric obscurants 
Attack at the speed-of-light Countermeasure problems 
Deep penetration into hidden 
targets Danger of fratricide 
Freedom from gravity Difficult damage assessment 
Low operational cost Relatively new technology 






























Rapid engagement of different 
targets 
  
Table 3.    Advantages and Disadvantages of DE weapons 
 
E. EFFECTS ON TARGETS 
There are various means of affecting targets using directed-energy weapons. The 
following discussion includes some of the commonly used terms to discuss these various 
means. 
Deny is a temporary action, and it is defined as the ability to eliminate the 
enemy’s operational capacity without inflicting harm, whereas degrade means to achieve 
this impact with minimal injury on the enemy systems. Deny and degrade are both 
similar in that they both are non-permanent and affected systems will return to normal 
operation within a period of time.  
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The concept of damage involves moderate injury to incapacitate the enemy 
systems for a certain period of time. This action may be permanent, depending upon the 
severity of the attack.  
Finally, destroy reflects the idea of permanent injury on the enemy systems which 
would be require total replacement.31 
In principle, depending on some conditions such as distance between the weapon 
and target, generated power, and target-hardening level, directed-energy weapons affect 
their targets through either a soft-kill or a hard-kill.  
1. Soft-Kill 
A soft-kill is achieved when the effects of a directed-energy weapon stops 
operation of the target system temporarily. As is understood from their definitions above, 
deny, degrade, and some damage effects are the practical methods of a soft-kill 
mechanism. Disrupting the electronics of a guided missile, causing it to miss its target, or 
suppressing or damaging visible, infrared, and microwave sensors might be given as 
examples of a soft-kill. The results are a temporary loss of function, but they can 
seriously compromise operational success.  
A soft-kill by directed-energy weapons against human targets means painful 
stimulation of human nerves, hearing or skin. After brain tissue absorbs an 
electromagnetic pulse, it slightly but rapidly expands and produces a supersonic wave 
which is received by the inner ear. If this pulse of energy exceeds a certain threshold and 
the supersonic wave is too strong, the human ear will not function.32 The Active Denial 
System, discussed in a later chapter, is an example of a directed-energy weapon which 
uses a soft-kill mechanism by heating up the skin's surface. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Air Univ Press Maxwell AFB AL and Walling 2000, 28. 
32 National Air Intelligence Center Wright-Patterson AFB Oh and Zhihao 1996, 4. 
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2. Hard-Kill 
Like conventional weapons, directed-energy weapons can defeat their targets by 
causing physical damage to the structure of the targets. A hard-kill is achieved when 
sufficient energy is delivered into the target system, such that it is permanently damaged 
or destroyed.33  Destroying a ballistic missile with an airborne laser during its boost 
phase by heating, melting, or vaporizing its skin is an example of a hard-kill. A hard-kill 
can include: 
• Structural damage 
• Melting of components 
• Shorting out electronics 
• Fusing and immobilizing moving parts 
Directed-energy weapons have adjustable kill mechanisms as well as both hard-
kill and soft-kill capacities, which makes them unique in comparison to kinetic energy 
weapons.  Instead of only destroying targets, directed-energy weapons have soft-kill 
potential which enables temporary damage and degradation. 
                                                 
33 Kopp and Pose, 5. 
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III. LASER WEAPONS 
Thirty years ago the vision of directed-energy weapons, using high energy 
lasers (HEL) and high power microwaves (HPM), was first seriously 
engaged by the military. Within a decade the capability of these weapons 
to destroy or disable targets had been proven, and numerous 
demonstrations of lethal effect, on increasingly difficult targets, have been 
carried out since then.34 
Albert Einstein was the first to describe the procedure that atoms could emit and 
absorb radiation. He later named this monumental innovation as the stimulated emission 
of radiation and that research led to the foundation for the development of laser systems. 
In stimulated emission processes, electrons stimulated by an incoming photon undergo a 
transition to a lower energy state. When a photon collides with an atom that is already 
excited, the atom releases two new outgoing photons identical to the incoming photon, at 
the same phase, frequency, and direction of propagation. Figure 5 shows an illustration of 
a stimulated emission process where E2 has a higher energy state than E1. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Stimulated Emission Process35 
 
In 1954, Charles Townes and Arthur Schawlow created the maser (Microwave 
Amplification by Simulated Emission of Radiation) well before theorizing the laser. The 
technology of a maser is very similar to that of a laser, but differs in that it does not use 
visible light. The maser gave new life to the idea of stimulated emission, thus leading the 
way for laser technology. In 1960, while working at Hughes Research Laboratories, 
Theodore H. Maiman developed the ruby laser, which is considered the first successful 
                                                 
34 Scientific Advisory Board (Air Force) Washington DC 1995, v. 
35 From Mansfield 2005, 53. 
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optical or light laser (Light Amplification by the Stimulated Emission of Radiation).36 
This first solid-state laser invention opened an entirely new vision for directed-energy 
weapons. 
A. INTRODUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 
1. How Laser Weapons Work 
A laser is a device that produces an intense unidirectional beam of coherent light. 
Unlike ordinary light, as generated by the sun or a light bulb, that scatters energy in a 
random fashion, the laser beam is coherent and almost uniform in wavelength, and travels 
in a single direction. These unique characteristics of the laser beam makes it important 
for military applications as will be described shortly. Lasers operate in the infrared, 
visible and ultraviolet sub-ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Lasers have at least three common components: 
• A lasing medium or an amplifying medium that increases the 
intensity of the light beam (gas, liquid, solid, semi-conductor) 
• A method of stimulation or pumping (pulse discharge, electricity, 
or chemical reaction) 
• A resonant cavity ( reflective mirrors)  
Laser lethality is largely a function of the fluence delivered on a target that must 
in turn couple with the target and exceed some failure threshold. Fluence is directly 
related with beam quality and beam control, which are the key technical challenges for 
laser systems. 
Beam quality is a measure of how effective the laser is in putting its light into a 
desired spot size (or area) at the target location. Once a laser beam is generated, it has to 
be the best possible quality so it will have the highest intensity when it reaches the distant 
target.37 
                                                 
36 Steward 2006, 214. 
37 Department of Defense Laser Master Plan 2000, 2. 
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Beam control is another major problem that tries to eliminate beam breakups. 
When laser energy is projected miles away, the beam is disrupted by the turbulent 
atmosphere. This is overcome by using adaptive optics that support the usage of low-
power laser systems to illuminate a target. The idea behind the adaptive optics is to 
neutralize the adverse effect of the atmosphere, thus allowing lower-power systems.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Schematic Diagram of Laser Weapon Systems38 
 
A basic laser system continuously locates and tracks the target with a standard 
rough target acquisition system. Fine target acquisition is used for the identification and 
tracking of targets thru an on-board active optics and electronics imaging system that 
delivers laser illumination to the target. After the fine target acquisition system works to 
lock onto and track the target in the continuous tracking mode, generation of the effective 
laser pulse is initiated. This pulse generated by the master oscillator is used to illuminate 
the target. When the laser beam is scattered by the atmosphere, the scattering radiation is 
reflected back and measured by the laser system so that the system can then calibrate the 
degree of atmospheric distortion. This return pulse contains information about the 
influence of atmospheric turbulence. Next, the deformation of the laser pulse generated 
by the atmospheric turbulence is calculated. The final stage involves sending this pulse 
back to the target once again, accounting for atmospheric turbulences to reconstruct the 
                                                 
38 From Defense Science Board Washington DC, Welch, and Latham 2001, 4. 
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original pulse waveform and energy with the added feature of beam collimation that will 
focus delivered fluence on a small cross-section of the target, perhaps focusing on critical 
optics and electronics. Final amplification and high-output fluence level is performed by 
high-power laser systems before the final transmitted pulse is sent to the target with the 
objective of destructive effects. In order to focus the beam energy on the target at a 
distance of several miles the influence of the atmospheric turbulence has to be fully 
compensated. 39 A common laser weapon’s work chart is showed schematically in Figure 
6.  
2. Propagation through the Atmosphere 
The study of the propagation of laser radiation through the atmosphere is 
important so as to be able to identify the optimum wavelength for efficient laser weapons 
to reach the target with sufficient energy. Lasers require high-intensity beams to 
propagate long distances under a wide range of atmospheric conditions. The intensity of 
the beam is degraded by these atmospheric effects with the result of lost photons from the 
projected beam. The major atmospheric interactions considered are absorption, scattering, 
turbulence, and thermal blooming. 
a. Absorption 
Absorption is the process where the incident radiation is absorbed by the 
medium, which will shorten the maximum distance for fluence levels to achieve the 
desired effects. The primary atmospheric components that contribute to absorption are 
water, carbon dioxide, diatomic oxygen (O2) and ozone. These molecules absorb the 
electromagnetic radiation and convert it to molecular vibration and rotation.40  
 
 
                                                 
39 Weise et al. 2004, 44. 
40 Weichel 1990. 
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There is no way to control the content of the atmosphere through which 
the beam is intended to propagate, therefore the best alternative is to choose a wavelength 
of light that is not greatly affected by this absorption process. A solution is to choose 
specific atmospheric “windows” where the selected laser wavelength is not greatly 
affected by absorption. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Atmospheric Absorption41 
 
Figure 7 presents a graph of the transmittance (the amount of energy 
allowed to pass through the atmosphere) as a function of wavelength. This figure shows 
there are narrow absorption bands at specific frequencies over a wide range of 
wavelengths. Therefore, the choice of laser wavelength to ensure high transmittance is 
critical for laser propagation.  
b. Scattering 
Atmospheric scattering is another important energy loss mechanism in the 
propagation of a laser beam that will shorten the maximum distance for desired effects. 
Here, electromagnetic radiation (photons) interacts with scattering centers in the 
atmosphere, such as aerosols (water, sea salt, organic matter, dust, soot, urban pollutants), 
and the energy is redistributed in directions that do not contribute to the intended use of 
the laser. There are three different kinds of scattering: 
                                                 
41 From Olsen 2005, 65 
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• Rayleigh scattering 
• Mie scattering 
• Non-selective scattering 
Rayleigh scattering (Figure 8) refers to the scattering of light off of 
molecules in the air. The radiation from Rayleigh scattering is emitted in all directions, 
causing a loss of energy in the light field as it propagates through the atmosphere. 
Mie scattering (Figure 8) is the scattering type when the scattering centers 
are roughly comparable to the size of the incident wavelength. These types of Mie 
scatterers are typically suspended aerosol particles or very small droplets of water. The 
radiation of incident energy is again in all directions, similar to Rayleigh scattering, but 
Mie scattering also results in much more scattered energy being radiated in the same 
direction as the incident photon (see the notional figure in the center and on the right side 
of Figure 8). 
Finally, non-selective scattering is the mechanism that results when the 
size of the scatterer is much larger than the wavelength. Non-selective scattering is the 
mechanism that describes what happens to light incident or passing through atmospheric 
phenomena such as fog, haze, and clouds. The term non-selective means that this type of 
scattering is independent of the wavelength. Non-selective scattering is very destructive 








                                                 
42 From Niles 2005, 30. 
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c. Turbulence 
Turbulence is another adverse atmospheric effect on laser beams, causing 
deformation of the beam. It is associated with temperature and density fluctuations in the 
atmosphere. These two fluctuations cause variations in the index of refraction of the air 
and cause fluctuations in the direction of the propagating light. 
The beam will encounter regions of higher and lower temperature and the 
sizes of the regions of temperature fluctuation may be smaller than the beam itself. This 
will bend different portions of the beam front in diverse directions. These temperature 
changes and turbulence are lowest during the hours of darkness, whereas there is usually 
a large rise right after sunrise.43 
d. Thermal Blooming 
Thermal blooming is distortion of a propagating beam caused by the 
heating of the air around it due to the high energy density of its laser beam. This 
nonlinear phenomenon creates plasmas in the air and causes loss of beam energy because 
of energy absorption. 
Several environmental factors affect thermal blooming, most importantly 
altitude and crosswinds. The net effect of increasing the altitude of a laser platform is to 
lessen thermal blooming. The reason is that aerosol content of the atmosphere, and 
therefore the absorption of beam energy, is larger at lower altitudes. Additionally, 
crosswinds blowing perpendicular to the beam (including those generated by the motion 
of the laser platform) mitigate thermal blooming by blowing the heated, expanding gases 
out of the way.44 
Thermal blooming can be controlled in a variety of ways, such as reducing 
the intensity of the beam. However, intensity reduction will spread out the beam. Beam 
spreading is undesirable, and for a destructive application can be controlled by increasing 
the size of the beam at the director. The greatest amount of fluence on a target due to a 
                                                 
43 Nielsen and National Defense University Press 1994, 121. 
44 Forden 1997, 45. 
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large beam at the director focuses the beam at the target. As the beam focuses, the local 
intensity (delivered fluence) increases which results in the thermal blooming threshold 
being exceeded. As a consequence, beam spread can be limited with sophisticated 
director optics, but can not be eliminated.  
3. Target Interaction 
The effectiveness of laser weapons basically depends on a relationship between 
target hardness, atmospheric distortions, wavelength, beam quality, and lasing duration. 
Damage capacity of a laser weapon increases when the output power of the weapon as 
well as dwell time is increased. On the other hand, it decreases when the wavelengths of 
the laser beam and the range are increased.  
There are two ways that laser weapons can destroy a target: thermal kill and 
mechanical kill (impulse kill). 
Thermal kill occurs when thermal energy directed by a laser weapon remains at 
the same point on a target, is absorbed by the target surface, and therefore results in 
Joulian heating. If the beam does not remain fixed on the same spot for long enough, a 
heated target’s surface might cool.45 Heating begins as soon as the laser light is absorbed 
at a target’s surface.46 As the laser beam intensity on the target continues to rise, the 
coupled effect results in melting that ends with drilling a hole through the target’s 
surface. With enough precision and dwell time, vaporization follows melting.  
Mechanical kill or “impulse kill” occurs when very intense, short laser pulses 
interact with a target’s surface, creating a shock wave that penetrates the target, possibly 
causing structural collapse and destroying internal mechanical components.47 Mechanical 
kill may require less energy (fluence) to damage or degrade a target’s performance than 
thermal kill, but requires higher intensities and shorter pulse widths.48 
                                                 
45 DiMaggio 1985, 19. 
46 Nielsen and National Defense University Press 1994, 181. 
47 DiMaggio 1985, 19. 
48 Nielsen and National Defense University Press 1994, 175. 
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B. LASER TYPES AND TECHNOLOGIES 
Although most lasers may seem to be similar in appearance, they are very 
different with regard to performance parameters and properties. Among these types of 
variation, it is the intended target and operating environment that largely determines the 
required performance properties such as energy or wavelength. 
Lasers are often differentiated by the kind of lasing medium, which can be gas, 
liquid, semiconductor, or solid state. Three major kinds of laser appear to have 
applications for directed energy weapons: chemical, electric (solid-state), and free-
electron lasers. 
1. Chemical Lasers 
Chemical lasers use chemical reactions to excite atoms and provide the pumping 
energy. The lasing molecules in a chemical laser obtain their energy from the process that 
creates them. Chemical lasers use the reactions of gases or liquids to create the excited 
energy states necessary for laser emission.49 They offer high energy levels in the 
megawatt range, but their military applications require large platforms to haul the large 
quantity of chemicals, in terms of volume, weight and fuel logistical problems. Potential 
chemical laser types are hydrogen fluoride (HF), deuterium fluoride (DF), and chemical 
oxygen iodine lasers (COIL). 
a. Hydrogen Fluoride 
In a hydrogen fluoride (HF) chemical laser, atoms of hydrogen (H) 
combine with the atoms of fluoride (F) to produce an excited molecule of hydrogen 
fluoride (HF). When this excited HF molecule returns to its normal stable state in the 
laser cavity, it emits light at a wavelength of about 2.7 microns, which will not propagate 
well in the earth’s atmosphere but is useful for applications in space.50  
 
                                                 
49 Air University Press Maxwell AFB AL and McCarthy 2000, 16. 
50 Schroeer 1987, 13. 
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b. Deuterium Fluoride  
The deuterium fluoride (DF) laser operates on the same basic principles as 
the hydrogen fluoride laser. Rather than molecular hydrogen, deuterium, which contains a 
neutron as well as a proton in its nucleus, reacts with atomic fluorine. Since the 
deuterium atoms have a greater mass than hydrogen atoms, they produce a longer 
wavelength laser light, in approximately the 3.8 microns region, where the atmosphere is 
more transparent.  
Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) is an example 
deuterium fluoride device that has successfully downed target drones and missiles via the 
use of a megawatt-class beam operating at a wavelength of 3,800 nanometers and with a 
power output in excess of 1 megawatt.51 52 53 
c. Chemical Oxygen Iodine 
Reactants for this type of laser include hydrogen peroxide, chlorine, and 
iodine. The lasing action is achieved by a chemical reaction between chlorine and 
hydrogen peroxide that produces oxygen molecules in an electronically excited state. 
Excited oxygen molecules transfer their energy to iodine atoms by collisions, which raise 
the iodine atoms to an excited state. The excited iodine atom is responsible for lasing at a 
wavelength of 1.3 microns, which is shorter than the output of either the hydrogen 
fluoride or deuterium fluoride laser.54 
This shorter wavelength allows the focusing of the beam to the target with 
smaller optics than the longer wavelength systems. The shorter wavelength also assures 
that diffraction will not limit the weapon’s range, especially at longer ranges. Finally, a 
                                                 
51 Air University Press Maxwell AFB AL and McCarthy 2000, 18. 
52 Schroeer 1987, 14. 
53 Thompson and Goure 2003, 7. 
54 Possel and Air University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology 1998, 8. 
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chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) is subjected to significantly less atmospheric 
absorption than the hydrogen fluoride laser, which maximizes the fluence distance of the 
system.  
2. Solid-State Lasers 
Solid-state lasers use a non-conductive glass or crystalline material that is doped 
with a species, such as neodymium or erbium, as the active medium. The prime example 
of such a solid-state laser would be the original ruby laser.55 
A solid-state laser relies only on material properties and prime (electrical) power 
and does not require flowing exotic gases or relativistic electron beams. For this reason, 
the system could be inherently smaller and less complex than other laser types. Solid-
state lasers also operate at about 1.06 microns, lower wavelengths than the COIL, which 
further simplifies the optics.56 
Although solid-state lasers have fine beam wavelengths, their largest challenge is 
power levels because of heat removal due to output efficiency limitations. The wasted 
heat in the laser medium increases the temperature and degrades the beam quality. 
3. Free-Electron Laser 
Free-electron lasers (FEL) generate streams of electrons from superconducting 
radio frequency accelerators to create a tunable beam. This represents a unique way of 
creating laser radiation without the use of chemicals, crystals, or any of the traditional 
ways of generating laser beams.  
Although they are currently limited to implementations at the kilowatt level and 
have the most complexity of the three laser alternatives, free-electron lasers are certainly 
the most attractive option for their potential to have adjustable, transmissible 
wavelengths, and for their potential cost effectiveness.  
                                                 
55 Air University Press Maxwell AFB AL and McCarthy 2000, 16. 
56 National Defense University Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy 
and Zimet 2002, 4. 
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•     Most developed 
 
•     Megawatt level 
•     Size and weight 
 
•     Safety requirements 
 
•     Sophisticated 
logistics 
SSL 1.06 µm 
•     Less complex 
•     Compact 
•     Less sensitive to  
shock 
•     Low electric energy 
requirements 
•     High efficiency 
•     Cooling problem 
•     Kilowatt level 
FEL Tunable •     Selectable wavelength 
•     Most complex 
•     Kilowatt-level limits 
•     Large systems 
Table 4.   Summary and Comparison of Laser Types  
 
C. TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC LASER WEAPONS 
Due to the unique nature of its coherent and intense light, lasers could easily be 
used as directed-energy weapons. Although rather ambiguous, laser weapons can be 
divided into three categories according to their power and energy levels, or the sensitivity 
of the target.  
Low-energy laser weapons, which are lower than 1 kW, are basically used as anti-
eye or anti-sensor systems. Eye damage can take various forms, depending on the 
wavelength used. Using a wavelength above 3 µm can damage the cornea in the human 
eye.57 If sufficient power is used, such a burn can make the cornea opaque and lead to 
                                                 
57 Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 21-24. 
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very painful injuries. In their anti-sensor role, low-energy lasers aim at either knocking 
out enemy photoelectric sensors and optical equipment for a certain time or purely 
destroying them.58 Attack on a sensor or optical equipment works well when the 
wavelength of the low-energy laser is within the operating wavelength range of these 
systems.  
The purpose of medium-energy laser weapons is the permanent destruction of 
optical and optoelectronic devices of ground, near-ground and air targets. These devices 
are valuable system components, for example, in the fire control systems of helicopters 
and tanks or the sensor heads of drones and missiles. Destroying these devices at relevant 
distances, including out-of-band and out-of-field-of-view effects, will at least result in a 
precision loss or mission kill.59 
The main anticipated use of high-energy laser weapons is destruction of material 
structure for air defense to destroy incoming munitions or aircraft before they reach their 
targets. Although many of these laser weapons exist, only a few of them can reach high 
enough energy levels.  These would be the chemical lasers, solid-state lasers, and free-
electron lasers. Within the next section three military applications and key features for 
high-energy laser weapons are generally described. These are the ground-based laser 
(GBL), the airborne laser (ABL), and the space-based laser (SBL). 
Laser classification according to energy level is given in Figure 9. 
 
                                                 
58 Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 25. 
59 Weise et al. 2004, 484. 
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Figure 9.   Energy Level Classification of Laser Weapons60 
 
1. Ground-Based Lasers  
a. Tactical High-Energy Laser 
The tactical high-energy laser (THEL) is a ground-based laser which uses 
a deuterium fluoride (DF) chemical laser and is designed for air-defense and the 
destruction of short-range rockets and artillery rounds at ranges of about ten kilometers. 
System development was initiated in 1996 and the first in-flight destruction of a live 
artillery rocket was achieved in June 2000.61   
The tactical high-energy laser (THEL) system includes three principal 
subsystems:  
• A command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) 
subsystem, which controls the fire control radar (FCR) as well as 
all laser subsystems (LS) and pointer-tracker subsystems (PTS). It 
manages the complete engagement, searching, the extended treat 
zone, detecting and classifying of aerial targets within its range, 
irradiating and destroying the designated targets, and providing kill 
assessment as well.62  
• A laser subsystem (LS), which uses a deuterium fluoride (DF) gas 
laser with good atmospheric propagation characteristics, generates 
the high-power laser beam for destruction of the target. 
                                                 
60 After Weise et al. 2004, 484. 
61 Horkovich 2006, 843-859. 
62 Sforza and Zmuda 2003, 37. 
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• A pointer-tracker subsystem (PTS), which optically tracks the 
target with sufficient precision to direct the lethal laser beam on 
the desired aim point and keeps the beam there until the target is 
destroyed (Figure 10). 
b. Mobile Tactical High-Energy Laser 
The mobile tactical high-energy laser (MTHEL) is another ground-based 
laser weapon system which uses a deuterium fluoride (DF) chemical laser, similar to the 
THEL, but with capabilities that go well beyond those of the THEL.  
The proposal to create a MTHEL system addresses one significant 
drawback of the THEL - mobility. Besides mobility, the MTHEL will extend the 
capability of the THEL by making the system lighter and smaller.  
Once the development of the MTHEL is completed, the system could be 
employed against a range of air-breathing targets such as ground attack aircraft, 
helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), short-range ballistic missiles, and cruise 
missiles. 
Figure 10 shows the tactical high-energy laser (THEL) and mobile tactical 
high-energy laser (MTHEL) together. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Ground-Based Laser Concept63 
 
                                                 
63 After Thompson and Goure 2003, 10. 
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2. Airborne Lasers  
Currently, there are two airborne laser weapons under development: the airborne 
laser (ABL) for boost phase missile defense and a new program, namely the advanced 
tactical laser (ATL), for air-to-ground operations. 
a. Airborne Laser (ABL) 
The airborne laser (ABL) is a multi-megawatt (MW) chemical oxygen-
iodine laser (COIL) weapon on a Boeing 747 platform. The ABL, cruising at 40,000 feet, 
engages and destroys ballistic missiles during the first phase of their flight at a 500-700 
kilometers standoff range. 
The boost phase is the first stage in a ballistic trajectory, when missiles 
present large and vulnerable targets that can be easily tracked. During the boost phase, 
infrared (IR) emission from the missile is so intense and almost impossible to hide. An 
attack during the boost phase can destroy a missile, carrying chemical or biological 
agents, over enemy territory before any smaller warheads are released. 
The ABL is arguably the most expensive military hardware to ever be 
flown in an aircraft, with its 1.5–meter-diameter telescope mounted on the nose of the 
aircraft.64 It has six onboard infrared sensors that provide 360 degrees of coverage to 
detect missile boost motor plumes. 
The airborne laser (Figure 11) is an extremely complex system consisting 
of four main assemblies: 
• The turret assembly, which locates and tracks targets and 
propagates the tracking illumination laser (TILL) beam. 
• The beam control assembly, which acquires the target, aligns the 
laser, and compensates for atmospheric distortion with a beacon 
illuminator laser (BILL). 
• The battle management and communications, command, control 
and intelligence subsystem, which provides engagement and fire 
control. 
                                                 
64 National Defense University Washington DC Center For Technology And National Security Policy 
and Zimet 2002, 5. 
 43
• The laser assembly, which provides chemical oxygen iodine laser 
(COIL) power.65 66 67 
 
 
Figure 11.   Airborne Laser (ABL)68 
 
Although its primary mission is missile defense, the ABL also has the 
potential to accomplish other missions such as counter-air, counter-space, and 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).  
b. Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) 
The advanced tactical laser (ATL) is another concept for an airborne laser 
that uses a less powerful version of the chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL), instead of 
missiles, to disable ground targets. This type of airborne laser has the advantage of being 
able to produce a surgical strike and lethal or non-lethal effects, particularly in an urban 
environment, at significant standoff distances.  
                                                 
65 Defense Science Board Washington DC, Welch, and Latham 2001, 213. 
66 Kochems and Gudgel 2006, 8. 
67 Forden 1997, 40-49. 
68 From Scott 2003, 6. 
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The ATL (Figure 12) will use laser power from the tens to a few hundred 
kilowatts to disable target sets including vehicles, aircraft, munitions, rockets/mortars, 
optical and radar surveillance systems, communication infrastructure, and other military 
targets.  
Although in the current demonstrations, several large platforms such as 
the C-130, AC-130, CV-22, and larger helicopters are being used to carry ATLs, fighter 
aircraft might be included in these platforms for solid-state advanced tactical lasers, even 
if their power source problems are overcome. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Advanced Tactical Laser Platforms69 70  
 
3. Space-Based Laser 
The space-based laser (SBL) is another high-energy laser type that uses a 
hydrogen fluoride (HF) chemical laser to achieve an effective, global ballistic missile 
defense capability. The SBL is currently envisioned to be a constellation of orbital laser 
weapons capable of engaging and destroying several classes of missiles, launched from 
anywhere in the world, during the boost phase.71  
                                                 
69 After Thompson and Goure 2003, 47. 
70 Army Aviation and Missile Command Redstone Arsenal AL Short-Range Air Defense (Shorad) 
Project Office (PO), Souder, and Langille 2004, 6. 
71 Defense Science Board Washington DC, Welch, and Latham 2001, 213. 
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The SBL will also have the capability to destroy or disable other space-based 
systems such as surveillance satellites. Moreover, a different laser type that has an 
appropriate wavelength other than that of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) chemical laser 
could attack ground targets.   
According to sources, the best space-based laser (Figure 13) concept would 
operate at an altitude of 1,300 km above the earth’s surface with twenty different space-
based platforms. This would provide a continuous worldwide defense ability to destroy 
hostile missiles launched anytime from anywhere on the globe. 
Each space-based laser platform consists of four major subsystems: 
• A laser device, which uses megawatt-class hydrogen fluoride (HF) 
chemical laser operating at 2.7 microns. 
• An optics and beam control system, which has a 2.4- to 4.0-meter-
diameter primary beam director and an integrated beam control 
system. 
• An acquisition, tracking, pointing and fire control (ATP/FC) 
system, which includes a stabilized platform to maintain the beam 
on the target.  
• Associated space systems, which provide the necessary electrical 
power, laser reactants, on-board data processing, and command 
and control.72  




Figure 13.   Space-based Laser73 
                                                 
72 From Possel and Air University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology 1998, 60. 
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The first uses space-based mirrors and places the laser on the ground. The distinct 
advantage of this architecture is that the high-energy laser is kept on the ground, which 
eliminates refueling and complex maintenance problems. Although it has an advantage, 
this option has disadvantages that include the requirement for higher energy levels to 
counter greater losses due to atmospheric transmission.  
A second option is deployment of space-laser weapons with large orbital mirrors. 
The concept behind this architecture is to increase the altitude of platforms and insert 
bifocal mirrors into the same orbit as the laser weapons. One distinct advantage of this 
architecture is the possibility of reducing the weight and expense of the system. Instead 
of twenty laser platforms, the concept requires roughly ten platforms and ten orbiting 
mission mirrors.74 This will decrease the number of laser platforms but will also require 
higher energy levels because of the higher orbital altitude.  
D. LASER COUNTERMEASURES AND PROTECTIVE TECHNIQUES 
Although there is no simple solution, from a technological point of view there are 
some means to protect against and counter laser weapons. Countermeasures will largely 
depend upon the duration of the target’s exposure to the laser beam, weather conditions, 
intensity of the laser, effectiveness of the laser weapon, and its targeting accuracy, beam 
pointing and tracking stability.  
It is evident that the most vulnerable target of low-energy and medium-energy 
laser weapons will be the optical and electro-optical systems, and the personnel behind 
the sights. A laser beam entering an electro-optical device such as night vision sights or a 
direct view optical system such as a telescope, as well as anyone looking through the 
system will suffer from its deposited energy. Any uncovered glass surface, namely 
eyeglasses, vision blocks, or binoculars, has the potential to attract or alert an anti-
electro-optical weapon's target acquisition system.75  
                                                                                                                                                 
73 Army and General Staff Coll Fort LeaVenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies and 
Lincoln 2004, 15. 
74 Possel and Air University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology 1998, 21. 
75 Ghosh 2001. 
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In order to avoid anti-electro-optical laser weapons the obvious protection will be 
the use of optical filters, individual eye protection, and detectors that provide a certain 
amount of hardening and blocking against the laser beam. Since only the sensitive parts 
of the electro-optical devices will be destroyed or blinded, indirect view might also be 
another protection technique against laser weapons. For example, using thermal imagers, 
image intensifiers or TV cameras for observation might protect the observers.76  
Using reflective devices and insulating targets with inexpensive materials can be 
used to decouple the beam from the target surface, but their use may result in increased 
counter-detection susceptibility.  
Tubular extensions over optical lenses and covering part of them with tape or 
some other type of material will lessen their chances of being detected and reduce their 
vulnerability.77  
Reducing the number of personnel in observation and minimizing the exposure of 
glass surfaces in the direction of laser weapons by positioning vehicles and weapons 
gives tactical protection over the low-energy and medium-energy laser weapons.78 
Another way to provide tactical protection is mimicking the atmospheric effects. 
Laser weapons will be effective only if they have a line-of-sight view to their targets. 
However, rain, smoke, fog, snow and dust are very effective as a countermeasure.  
Rotating static positional targets and concealing the target damage signature will 
be the easiest tactical protection method against the low-energy and medium-energy 
lasers, whose kill mechanism depends on holding the beam on a vulnerable portion of the 
target for a period of time.  
A general countermeasure to high-energy lasers would be the hardening of the 
target. High-energy laser light causes damage only if the target absorbs its energy. If the 
 reflectivity of the surfaces were sufficiently great, the possibility of damage to them 
                                                 
76 Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 30. 
77 Ghosh 2001. 
78 Bayer 1986, 46. 
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would be reduced. Here, rotation will also be effective and will spread the laser energy 
over a larger area to reduce the impact of the beam.  
Last but not least, the most effective countermeasure against laser weapons is 
attacking them with weapons before they engage their targets.  Table 5 summaries the 
material and tactical protective techniques against laser weapons. 
 
Material Tactical 
Covering optical lenses with tape Conceal target damage signature 
Filters, detectors, and protectors Covered or shielded unused glass surfaces 
Indirect viewing Hit them before they hit you 
Reflective and harden materials Mimicking atmospheric effects 
Tubular extensions over optical 



























Rotate static openings 
Table 5.   Laser Countermeasures Summary 
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IV. HIGH-POWER MICROWAVE WEAPONS 
In a future war where all sides depend heavily on electronic systems, 
weaponry and command and control, a weapon that disrupts and damages 
these systems will be extremely valuable. If it can perform this function at 
the speed of light, with minimal prior target information and with 
minimum collateral damage, it will be especially useful.79 
A. PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF HIGH-POWER MICROWAVES 
As weapon systems become increasingly dependent on electronic components, 
they also become more susceptible to microwave radiation. Producing output power into 
the gigawatt range has stimulated interest in using high-power microwave weapons in 
military applications in both offensive and defensive roles to disrupt or destroy enemy 
electronic systems. 
1. Structure and Basic Considerations 
High-power microwaves (HPM) are another type of directed-energy weapon, 
having a much longer wavelength and much lower frequency than the laser. Although the 
term microwave technically only applies to the highest-frequency radio waves, namely 
those operating in the gigahertz range, it has become commonplace to refer to all 
directed-energy weapons operating at radio frequencies as high-power microwaves. 
Rather than operating in the infrared, visual, or ultra-violet spectra, high-power 
microwave weapons generate and deliver electromagnetic waves in the microwave 
frequency band from approximately 100 MHz to 100 GHz, corresponding to wavelengths 
from 3 m to 3 mm. High-power means that the microwave source is able to generate a 
peak power of more than 100 MW. 
A typical high-power microwave weapon has the following three main 
components as shown in Figure 14: 
                                                 
79 Bolkcom and Tatman 1997. 
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• A pulse power source, which generates highly amplified electronic 
pulses that drive the high-power microwave source. 
• A high-power microwave source, which is the heart of the weapon 
and converts kinetic or potential energy in the beam to 
electromagnetic energy, in the form of microwaves, to be delivered 
to the target. 
• An antenna, which directs the microwaves toward a target and acts 
as the mechanical interface between the atmosphere and the 
microwave source.80 81  
 
 
Figure 14.   Basic Set-up of a HPM System 82 
 
Besides these three components high-power microwave weapons have tracking, 
aiming and control systems. 
High-power microwave weapons are typically sub-categorized as either 
narrowband or ultra-wideband systems. Narrowband (NB) weapons produce a single 
frequency or closely clustered frequencies with the bandwidth being only a few percent 
of the center frequency at very high power. Therefore, when using a narrowband source, 
knowledge of the frequency dependent target, meaning the absorption as a function of 
frequency and aspect angle, is an advantage. This knowledge can be achieved in principle 
by scanning the target with a tunable low-energy source and receiving and evaluating the 
reflected signals for missing frequencies (high absorption at the target). However, it must 
                                                 
80 National Air Intelligence Center Wright-Patterson AFB OH, Li, and Wang 1996, 16. 
81 Sforza and Zmuda 2003, 17. 
82 After Scannell 2003, 6. 
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be recognized that all high-energy narrowband sources are not easily, or even not at all, 
tunable in a bandwidth worth mentioning.83 
Ultra-wideband (UWB) weapons radiate over a broad frequency range, but 
deliver less energy at any specific frequencies. Ultra-wideband weapons are intended for 
use against a wide range of different systems, rather than defeat of a narrow-focused and 
well-defined target or class of targets.  
Narrowband high-power microwave systems have better transmission 
characteristics and fewer problems with fratricide than ultra-wideband systems. Besides, 
narrowband systems require prior knowledge of the threat so as to identify the specific 
frequency of interest and are more susceptible to countermeasures such as hardening.   
Ultra-wideband high-power microwave weapons provide a broad capability range 
even with little or no knowledge of the target. Since the destructiveness of ultra-wideband 
high-power microwave weapons depends on their distance from the target, they have 
shorter effective ranges than narrowband weapons which usually have higher radiated 
power. 
2. High-Power Microwave Sources 
As the heart of the high-power microwave weapon, high-power microwave 
sources have been under investigation for several years, and many varieties of microwave 
sources exist. High-power microwave sources include the traditional magnetron and 
klystron as well as newer devices such as the virtual-cathode oscillator (vircator), 
gyrotron and free-electron laser. 
In contrast to a magnetron, the physical structure of the klystron permits higher 
power and frequencies. While they could deliver the requisite power levels, they are 
problematic with regard to size, mass, and power consumption. Another negative feature 
is that they have a limited tuning ability.84 
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Vircators generate microwave energy at centimeter wavelengths and are 
candidates for future high-power microwave weapons. The vircator is of particular 
interest because it is a one-shot device capable of producing a very powerful single pulse 
of radiation, yet it is mechanically simple, small and robust, and can operate over a 
relatively broad band of microwave frequencies.85 
Gyrotrons are another new type of microwave source that operate at millimeter 
wavelengths, and are capable of continuous wave operations at very high power levels. 
The disadvantages of gyrotron devices are their size, weight and very narrow 
bandwidth.86  
B. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES  
High-power microwave weapons provide new means and interesting operational 
characteristics for both defensive and offensive operations. First, a HPM weapon is a 
wide-area weapon that can affect multiple targets with minimal prior data on threat 
characteristics. It could be used while focused or in a scan mode to cover a region of vast 
extent. HPM weapons illuminate every target within their beams’ path, near or far. Their 
area effect depends on several factors, such as frequency generated, distance from target 
area, the characteristics of the antenna, and susceptibility of the targets. 
Second, they are tunable weapons that allow users to vary the effects imposed on 
the different targets, such as electronic equipment and people. They do not provide 
significant collateral damage like chemical and biological weapons do. They could 
possibly be employed against targets in urban environments or where collateral damage 
and casualty concerns constrain the use of explosive or kinetic weapons. They do not 
cause physical or structural damage, yet they still permit strikes against a range of high-
value targets such as military and civil communications systems, ammunition and fuel 
depots, transportation systems or even critical industrial facilities.   
                                                 
85 Monash University Clayton (Australia) and Kopp 1996, 31. 
86 Taylor and Giri 1994, 28. 
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Third, they have all-weather attack capability. Microwave beams, just like radio, 
television and radar signals, can propagate in clouds, dust, snow, rain and most other 
atmospheric conditions. 
Fourth, they are three-dimensional weapons. HPM weapons might be particularly 
useful against buried targets or those that are located in populated areas. They not only 
can cause injury, kill surgical targets and do great damage or performance degradation to 
electronic equipment on the ground, but also can penetrate buried and protected targets.87 
Fifth, HPM weapons can be effective against electronics even when those systems 
are turned off. However, this might be limited to just damage effect and can be achieved 
only if a weapon system produces sufficient fluence on the target. The very single 
effective defense is to isolate the target from the means of conducting energy, which 
might produce a mission kill.88 
Sixth, when compared to other kinetic or biological weapon systems. HPM 
weapons have reduced life cycle costs and provide a deep magazine. Unlike conventional 
systems, microwave weapons require little logistical support, backup missiles or 
ammunition. Their bullets are simply electrical energy derived from their power sources.  
Lastly, they are multi-platform weapons that can be carried by unmanned air 
vehicles (UAV), land vehicles, aircraft, tactical fighters, helicopters, bombs or missiles, 
ships, and even by manned  or unmanned future combat system (FCS) platforms.  
1. How High-Power Microwave Weapons Affect Their Targets  
High-power microwave energy can affect anything that responds to electro- 
magnetically induced voltages and currents, to include electronics, materials and 
personnel. Two mechanisms are at work within objects caught in a high-power 
microwave beam:  molecular heating and electrical stimulation (Figure 15).89  
                                                 
87 Guoqi Ni, Benqing Gao, and Junwei Lu 2005, 4. 
88 Thompson and Goure 2003, 25. 
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Once microwave energy reaches a target, a sequence of penetration and 
propagation processes will take place from the target’s outer surface into its interior. 
Molecular heating is the result of narrowband high-power microwave weapons on the 
target’s outer surface. The molecules of the target rub together due to the power of the 
microwave energy.  The power required to gain this effect is quite large and a significant 
dwell time on intended target is necessary. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Range vs. Effects 90 
 
The other efficient mechanism takes place when the microwave energy ultimately 
arrives at the target’s electronics. Microwave weapon systems have the ability to produce 
graduated effects in the target electronics, depending upon the amount of energy that is 
coupled to the target. Coupling begins with an exterior response on shielded systems like 
aircraft, tanks and other targets. Later, the energy that is received can be subsequently 
transmitted deeper into the electronics through the circuitry pathways that exist within the  
 
 
                                                 
90 After Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Div Patuxent River MD and Frazier 2000, 18. 
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target itself.91 The power level and dwell time required for electrical stimulation are 
much smaller than for molecular heating, which allows longer engagement range (Figure 
15). 
Depending on the coupling, high-power microwave effects can change from 
degraded system interaction to more serious destructive accomplishments. For electrical 
stimulation or penetration into the target, high-power microwave weapons use two 
different coupling mechanisms. 
a.  Front-Door Coupling 
Front-door coupling denotes in-band penetration through the target with 
its own antenna, which is designed to receive microwaves such as communication 
antennas, radar antennas or altimeters.  If unprotected, these coupling paths provide an 
easy entrance at in-band frequencies. In-band damage or performance degrading requires 
that the attacking microwaves be of the same frequency as those the target is tuned to 
receive. Out-band signals may also couple with front-door openings and overwhelm the 
target, but are weaker as they do not couple as efficiently. 
The disadvantage of in-band damage or performance degrading is the need 
to know the target’s operating frequency in advance, or to obtain that information in real 
time and adjust the weapon’s output appropriately. A common countermeasure to in-band 
attack is frequency hopping, which means changing the frequency with each pulse. The 
counter to this countermeasure is to attack over a broad band of frequencies, but this 
carries with it the disadvantage of spreading the weapon’s available energy over a broad 
band.92  
b. Back-Door Coupling 
Back-door coupling is a more complex mechanism and refers to any 
radiation coupling that follows a path other than an antenna, such as windows, slots, 
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seams, improperly shielded wires, cracks or gaps. Any conductive material can provide a 
path for energy to reach key electronic components. Back-door paths require higher 
energy levels before damage or performance degrading is likely to occur, but they are 
typically much more difficult to diagnose or eliminate.  
2. Lethality of High-Power Microwave Weapons 
High-power microwave weapons cause four levels (upset, lock-up, latch-up, and 
burnout) of destructive effect in electronic devices depending on: 
• Distance to the target 
• Vulnerability of the target 
• Weapon frequency 
• Generated power level and power density on the target 
• Bandwidth 
• Burst rate and pulse duration  
• Dwell time on the target 
• Coupling mode or entry points 
Four potential effects of high-power microwave weapons on targets can be 
categorized into a hierarchy of lethality, which require increasing microwave emission on 
the target. 
a.  Upset 
Upset means particular interaction as observed between a weapon and the 
operating state of the target system at the time, as the system state changes, upsets could 
subside. Once the signal is removed, the affected system can be easily restored to its 
previous condition. Interference caused by jamming equipment or lightning are examples 
of this type of deny effect.  
b.  Lock-up 
Lock-up produces a temporary alteration similar to upset, but electrical 
reset or shut off and restart is necessary to regain functionality after the radiation is 
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removed. Degrading is an example which requires the intervention by an external 
operator or special safeguard procedures to reload the target system.  
c.  Latch-up 
Latch-up defines an extreme form of lock-up in which circuits of the target 
are permanently destroyed or electrical power is cut off, which spoils the target’s 
mission. No responding semiconductor devices to an input or transistors failing on a 
circuit board due to overloads from radiation are two latch-up examples. 
d.  Burnout 
Burnout occurs when the high-power microwave energy causes melting in 
capacitors, resistors or conductors. Burnout mostly occurs in the junction region where 
multiple wires or the base collector or emitter of a transistor come together, and often 
involves electrical arcing. Consequently, the heating is localized to the junction region. A 
lightning strike’s effect on electronic devices is a burnout example.  
C. HIGH-POWER MICROWAVE WEAPONS AND ELECTRONIC 
WARFARE 
The term electronic warfare (EW) refers to any military action involving the use 
of electromagnetic (EM) and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or 
to attack the enemy. There are three major subdivisions of EW: electronic attack (EA), 
electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES).  
Directed energy and directed-energy weapons are primarily involved in EA. This 
division of electronic warfare involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed 
energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the 
intent of denying, degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is 
considered a form of fire. EA includes:  
• Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception 
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• Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed 
energy as their primary destructive mechanism 93  
Therefore, directed-energy weapons and ultimately high-power microwaves are 
integral to electronic warfare.  
Although both traditional electronic warfare systems and microwave weapons 
rely on the frequency spectrum, pulsed energy, waveform and peak power to work 
against enemy electronics, high-power microwave weapons are distinct from traditional 
electronic warfare systems on several counts.  
The first and most obvious point is that high-power microwave weapons do not 
rely on extensive prior knowledge of the target system. In order to jam or spoof, 
electronic warfare systems have to be at the target’s frequency and modulation, which is 
countered by using filters or increasing the frequency bandwidth of the system.  
A second, related feature is that electronic warfare systems will affect target 
systems only when they are operating/transmitting-receiving. However, high-power 
microwave weapons can affect enemy systems even when they are turned off.  
A third important aspect of high-power microwaves is that their effects continue 
after exposure has ended. Unlike conventional electronic warfare systems, which have 
just deny and disturb capacity, HPMs can leave persisting and lasting effects on enemy 
targets through damage or performance degrading and destruction of electronic circuits, 
components, and subsystems. 94 
A fourth key characteristic of high-power microwave weapons is that instead of 
just having front-door coupling features, microwave weapons also damage or degrade 
their targets’ performance through backdoors, where there is no perfect way to defend 
(Figure 16). Due to high-power microwave weapons’ stealthy characteristics, there is no 
easy way to determine the back door openings available to microwave weapons. Damage 
is done without victim knowledge. For this reason the target systems must be hardened in 
                                                 
93 Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington DC 2005, 179. 
94 Air University Press Maxwell AFB AL and Walling 2000, 2. 
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their entirety, not just individual components or circuits. This makes countermeasures 
against high-power microwaves difficult. 
 
Figure 16.   EW Systems and HPM Systems Coupling Methods 95 
 
Table 6 shows the unique characteristics of high-power microwave weapons 
compared to classic electronic warfare systems. 
 
HPM Weapons Classic EW Systems 
Do not rely on exact knowledge Target-specific knowledge required 
Affect targets even turned off Affect targets when operating 
Effects continue after exposure Effects last as long as exposure 
Back-door coupling 





























Difficult countermeasure Easy countermeasure 
Table 6.   Differences Between EW Systems and HPM Weapons 
 
                                                 
95 After Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Div Patuxent River MD and Frazier 2000, 18. 
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D. HIGH-POWER MICROWAVE APPLICATIONS AND TARGETS 
To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
 
High-power microwave weapons are the most promising type of direct-energy 
weapons for military and law enforcement operations due to the increasing application of 
electronics. Generally, as modern devices become more electrically sophisticated, the 
more vulnerable they become against high-power microwaves. As described earlier, the 
rate and degree to which microwave weapons affect targets depends upon numerous 
factors of both the weapon itself and the design of the target.  
High-power microwave weapons provide a range of strategic, operational, and 
tactical capabilities in both offensive and defensive areas.  
Among the most likely near-term applications of high-power microwaves are as 
an adjunct to precision-strike weapons. High-power microwave weapons could address 
the problem posed by underground or deeply buried targets. In addition, a high-power 
microwave weapon could be employed against targets in urban environments or where 
collateral damage and casualty concerns constrain the use of explosive or kinetic 
weapons.96 
Air defense systems are extremely intensive users of electronics, to include 
tracking radars, targeting radars, communications, and missile guidance, control and 
intercept functions. By their nature, they are highly vulnerable to microwave attacks. 
High-power microwave weapons could destroy the entire enemy defense system and 
could be used for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).  
Similarly, high-power microwave weapons could be used to damage and degrade 
performance electronic systems in the enemy’s front-line equipment. Potential targets 




communications, artillery targeting capability, and the guidance and control functions on 




Figure 17.   HPM Weapons Close Air Support98 
 
One possible defensive application of microwave weapons is against missiles. 
Surface-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, cruise missiles and many 
other types are significant threats to large and small aircraft, ships and armored vehicles. 
However, these missiles are guided by a variety of sensor systems, such as infrared, 
electro-optic, laser-guided or a combination. Even if a microwave weapon could operate 
within the timing of the missile navigation or guidance systems or in the command and 
control elements, by disabling the guidance and control functions of the approaching 
missile, a high-power microwave weapon might be an effective means of protection.  
High-power microwave weapons could also be used to attack critical enemy 
military and civil infrastructures such as telecommunication systems, power grids, 
transportation systems, radio and television stations, civil emergency services, finance 
and banking systems, oil and gas control and refining stations, and security systems. This 
                                                                                                                                                 
96 Thompson and Goure 2003, 26. 
97 Air Univ Press Maxwell AFB AL and Walling 2000, 18. 
98 After Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 69. 
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might cause confusion for the enemy before tactical assaults by other (more 
conventional) means. Contrary to this, high-power microwave weapons could be used to 
defend critical national infrastructures, high-value targets, and air defense systems.  
High-power microwave weapons will prove to be a valuable tool in law 
enforcement as non-lethal weapons.  They can be used against hostile crowds to disable 
or stop criminal land, sea, and air vehicles without hazard to the public associated with 
firearms.  
Table 7 illustrates a number of possible high-power microwave applications. 
 
Potential HPM Targets Potential HPM Applications 
Acquisition and tracking radars  Air interdiction of C4I  
Avionic systems Aircraft self-protection 
Command, control, 
communications, computing and 
intelligence (C4I) systems 
Close air support 
Electro-explosive devices Counter surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles  
EW equipment Degrade enemy air control 
Missile guidance Non-lethal weapon 























Sensor systems   Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) 
Table 7.   Potential HPM Weapon Applications and Targets  
 
 
For the conduct of future warfare, it is vitally important to reduce the size and 
weight of high-power microwave weapons. This will enhance mobility and raise the 
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efficiency of high-power microwave weapons.  Although long-range space defense and 
other similar applications might not be feasible within a short time, improvements in the 
power levels are continuing. 
E. DEFENSE AGAINST HIGH-POWER MICROWAVE WEAPONS 
The most effective defense against high-power microwave weapons is to prevent 
their operations by destroying their operating platforms. This may not always be possible, 
and therefore systems that can be expected to suffer from high-power microwave 
weapons must be hardened.  
The most reliable robust strategy for protection against high-power microwave 
weapons is to wholly contain the vulnerable equipment in an electrically conductive 
metal shielding or enclosure. This closed barrier surface, termed a Faraday cage, excludes 
the effects of all sources outside the shield and prevents the electromagnetic field from 
gaining access to protected equipment.  
Complete and uncompromised topological shielding is a difficult protective 
technique to implement and requires containment of either full platforms or facilities. 
Even if a system was perfectly shielded, such a system would still need to communicate 
with and be fed power from the outside. These openings could provide vulnerability to 
high-power microwave entry. 
Another countermeasure is to use a layered defense with filters, where the 
damaging radiation or voltages must penetrate several segments. In order to provide in-
band filtering, systems use the narrowest feasible tunable filters to keep out all possible 
in-band energy. For out-band filtering, systems use low-pass and high attenuation filters 
at radio frequency interfaces below the high-power microwave spectrum.  
The use of surge-protective devices is another protective technique against high-
power microwave weapons and an alternative to using filters. These are nonlinear devices 
that limit surge voltage to safe levels. Although surge-protective devices are commonly 
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used, there are a number of significant problems with their application.  Device failure 
detection and defective identification are two major problems with these systems.99 
Fiber optic cables, which contain no metal as a strain relief or protective jacket, 
can also reduce the effects of high-power microwave weapons. However, either end of 
the optical connections must also be hardened.  
Using one system at a time during the threat period is a tactical protective 
measure against high-power microwave weapons. Unused devices should be 
disconnected from power and antennas and kept in the Faraday cages.100 
Another strategy against a high-power microwave weapons attack is multi-layer 
shielding to eliminate their line-of-sight propagation. In-depth defense with multiple 
shields with staggered joints minimize penetration probability.  
Likewise to these countermeasures against high-power microwave weapons, 
system maintenance, which ensures that hardening fixes retain the necessary level, is 
another key issue to keep vulnerable systems operating properly.  
Table 8 lists current possible high-power microwave protective techniques.  
 
• Shielding and filtering 
• Extreme care in eliminating very small openings 
• Gasketing 
• Flexible metal jackets on cables 
• Multi-layer shielding 
• Welded structures 
• Non-metallic cables (fiber optics) 
• Minimization of metal fixtures and fastenings in non-metallic structures 
                                                 
99 Taylor and Giri 1994, 192. 
100 Steward 2006, 213. 
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• Narrow beam antennas with minimum side lobes 
• Laser communications 
• Internal optical communications 
• Conductive foil over joints 
• Interval system usage 
Table 8.   High-power Microwave Protective Techniques 101 102 
 
Although high-power microwave weapons have much destructive potential, the 
hardening of equipment is technically feasible to some extent. Instead of partial 
protection, hardening of equipment must be carried out at system levels and in a 
comprehensive manner. Most importantly, experience and testing shows that hardening 
new systems by design is significantly easier than attempting to harden existing 
systems.103  Also, experiences learned about the protection of systems from hostile 
transients from the EMI/EMC world might be directly applied to the HPM hardening 
problem as well. 
                                                 
101 After Keuren and Knighten 1995, 484. 
102 After Wilkenfeld, Knighten, and Keuren 1991, 20. 
103 Monash University Clayton (Australia) and Kopp 1996, 17. 
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V. COMPARISON OF DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS 
The theories behind the various types of directed-energy weapons are very 
similar, involving what is in essence slight variations of electromagnetic radiation. While 
lasers generate tightly focused beams of monochromatic (single frequency) photon 
energy in the visible and infrared region of the electromagnetic spectrum, high-power 
microwave devices generate much less focused beams of energy in the radio frequency 
range of the electromagnetic spectrum.104 
The difference between the two is that they have different wavelengths so that 
they take advantage of a different portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. However, 
electromagnetic waves are characterized by how fast they spread out (diffraction), how 
far they propagate (range), how they interact with various types of matter, how they 
propagate through the atmosphere, and how they are created. These characteristics all 
arise from variations in the wavelength and photon energy.105  
High-power microwave wavelengths are longer than that of lasers. As a feature of 
the atmosphere, diffraction or light spreading increases when the wavelengths increase. 
This spreading decreases the amount of energy placed on a target. Thus, high-power 
microwave weapons can project less energy into a large area, for a fixed range, than laser 
weapons. 
Shorter wavelength light is less affected by diffraction but can be more strongly 
affected by device optical imperfections, turbulence, jittering and other atmospheric 
effects.  Since laser wavelengths are shorter than high-power microwave wavelengths and 
about the same size as atmospheric gas molecules, they scatter in the atmosphere more 
than microwaves do. However, a smaller wavelength increases the energy, decreases the 
diffraction of laser weapons, and makes lasers more effective over longer distances. Laser 
energy may directly interact with the outer material of the target, which provides a 
potential hard-kill mechanism.  
                                                 
104 Geis and Air University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology 2003, 8. 
105 Beason 2005. 
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A. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LASER WEAPONS 
One of the major advantages of laser weapons is their precise targeting and 
discrimination, which reduces the miss casualties and fratricide potential associated with 
high-power microwave weapons. However, this precision requires complex tracking and 
pointing systems that are susceptible to losses due to vibration and jittering. This 
precision also limits the engagement to one target at a time. 
Although damage assessment for low-energy and medium-energy laser weapons 
is difficult for the gunner, kill assessment and immediate feedback is much easier for 
high-energy laser weapons than high-power microwave weapons. 
Another advantage of laser weapon systems is the straight line of sight along 
which the energy is delivered. It is not necessary to calculate a ballistic trajectory, as is 
the case with normal munitions. Consequently, laser weapons (especially low-energy 
laser weapons) do not require very costly and complex fire control systems to calculate 
their trajectories.106  
Different from other weapon systems, laser weapons are very effective against 
maneuvering and crossing targets. Even the fastest target will present minimal problems 
to the laser beam director in holding the beam on the target. However, a target pulling 
such Gs will be much more susceptible to fail after being destructed by the laser weapon. 
A crossing target presents its profile rather than just its nose to the high-energy laser 
weapon, which increases the target’s vulnerability to a guidance or propellant kill.107  
Directed-energy weapon wavelengths have to be roughly the same size of the 
target to cause any damage or performance degradation. Laser weapons are about the  
same size as solid material molecules. Thus, laser weapons can deposit their energy 
through most material structures whereas high-power microwave weapons pass through 
most materials and are not much of a threat.108  
                                                 
106 Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 166. 
107 National Defense University Washington DC Center For Technology And National Security 
Policy and Zimet 2002, 9. 
108 Beason 2005, 186. 
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Although fratricide is not considered a problem, target suitability is one of the 
disadvantages of laser weapons. Laser weapons are mostly effective against thin-skinned 
targets or those that can be damaged with a small spot beam area. Their effects are 
minimal on hardened and armored targets. The lethality and effective range are directly 
related to laser beam quality and laser power as explained in Chapter III. Their current 
low megawatt power is not sufficient enough to affect hardened targets. Figure 18 shows 
the required laser power levels for sample targets.109 110 
 
 
Figure 18.   Required Laser Power Levels for Sample Targets111 
 
One of the main difficulties with high-energy lasers is that they are unable to 
operate through inclement weather. They are affected by conditions within the 
atmosphere, whether naturally occurring or manufactured. A modern laser system such as 
the airborne laser weapon (ABL) employs adaptive optics to compensate for the problem 
of beam attenuation caused by atmospheric turbulence. In addition, the airborne laser 
                                                 
109 Campbell 2000. 
110 Thompson and Goure 2003, 21. 
111 From Richard J. Dunn, III 2006, 7. 
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addresses the problem of weather and obscurants by engaging targets above the cloud 
level (forty thousand feet or twelve kilometers above the earth).  However, fog, smoke, 
clouds and other obscurants will be a problem for near-Earth laser weapons, such as the 
tactical high-energy laser (THEL) or mobile tactical high-energy laser weapon 
(MTHEL).112 Simply stated, lasers will probably never be complete all-weather weapons.  
Another important weakness of laser weapons is that they are line-of-sight 
weapons, which means they have no indirect-fire mode and cannot shoot beyond the 
system’s visual horizon.113 In current technical conditions, an obstruction that provides 
cover or blocks line-of-sight vision might hinder the effectiveness of laser weapons. This 
disadvantage could be used as an easy countermeasure against laser weapons. 
The other great disadvantage of visible laser beams, as a weapon, is the source 
pinpointing which reveals location of the laser platform.  Laser beams can also be 
detected and located by laser warning receivers. 
Hardening techniques as a countermeasure against laser weapons are not as 
complicated or as hard to accomplish as is a defense against high-power microwave 
weapons. Since their lethality starts from the outside and goes to the inside, simple 
shielding or modification of vulnerable targets might be effective against laser weapons. 
In addition, some tactical countermeasures work well against laser weapons as explained 
in Chapter III.  
Cost is probably the biggest disadvantages to some types of high-energy laser 
weapons such as the space-based laser. For example, the space-based laser costs almost 




                                                 
112 Thompson and Goure 2003. 
113 Kochems and Gudgel 2006, 8. 
114 Possel and Air University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology 1998, 60. 
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B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF HIGH-POWER 
MICROWAVE WEAPONS 
Area coverage is one of the critical advantages of high-power microwave 
weapons. Unlike a laser weapon, which can engage one target at a time, a high-power 
microwave weapon can simultaneously affect every target within the beam’s pathway 
with minimal prior target information. 
Another advantage of microwave energy is its all-weather attack capacity or 
insensitivity to weather. Compared to laser weapons, which are greatly affected by 
atmospheric conditions, microwave weapons are mostly unaffected by clouds, rain, snow, 
dust and most other atmospheric obstacles. 
Opposite to laser target suitability and line-of-sight attack capability, many targets 
are very sensitive to high-power microwave weapons even if they are completely covered 
or hidden behind walls. As most of the modern military targets are heavily dependent on 
a wide variety of sensitive electronic components, they are becoming more vulnerable to 
microwave weapons.  
Countermeasures and defense against high-power microwave systems is very 
expensive and not well understood. Modernization of expected weak targets against high-
power microwave weapons might not work as planned, and in addition might place those 
systems into jeopardy with minor openings that are not shielded completely. Producing 
new systems totally hardened against high-power microwave systems will have a limited 
life cycle, which also needs to be renewed periodically. This will make such protection 
expensive.  
Microwaves have been used for communication and radar systems since the 
1940s. As a result, the technology for high-power microwaves is more advanced than for 
laser weapons.115  
Minimum collateral damage and performance degradation is another key 
advantage of high-power microwave systems. High-power microwave weapons are 
                                                 
115 Nielsen and National Defense University Press 1994, 218. 
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ideally suited for low-intensity conflicts, politically sensitive environments and non-lethal 
applications since they attack the electronics of adversary systems rather than munitions 
or personnel using them, and they go for a function kill of the target rather than for 
damaging its structure or harming its crew.116 117 
High-power microwave weapons require less accurate targeting, so that they have 
a simplified pointing and targeting system. Instead of being precisely aimed and pointed, 
they need only be directed generally toward the targets. However, this causes less 
destructive energy on a specific target or target area than laser weapons.  
In addition, diffraction or spreading out of the high-power microwave beams is 
much greater than for laser light. This enhances coupling techniques to larger objects and 
distributed entryways of high-power microwaves over straight-line propagated laser 
weapons.  
The first and most obvious drawback of high-power microwave weapons is 
fratricide. Since high-power microwave weapons are not discriminating weapons, they 
will affect anything in their beam's radiation path on the ground or in the air. It is likely 
that unshielded or unprotected friendly systems would be as vulnerable as target systems. 
In order to minimize this disadvantage, as written in the previous chapter, critical friendly 
systems should be hardened during their design phase.  
Another potential disadvantage to the military application of high-power 
microwave weapons is the ability to make a damage or performance degrading 
assessment. Not all electronic systems will respond the same way to the deposition of an 
equal amount of energy. In addition, unlike the obvious damage caused by high-energy 
laser weapons, microwave weapons affect the electronics inside the target systems and 
this may not prove lethal, or may be more difficult to observe.118  
Limited range and power is another important multi-dimensional problem and 
disadvantage of high-power microwave weapons. Due to the atmospheric breakdown, 
                                                 
116 Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 69. 
117 Scannell 2003, 2. 
118 Thompson and Goure 2003, 32. 
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which absorbs and limits the energy directed to the targets, high-power microwave 
weapon systems need more power to overcome this limitation.119 Nevertheless, this 
makes the microwave weapon system platforms bigger and provides a large visual 
signature due to their size. At some point, current technologies are not mature enough to 
produce such high-average power sources. Furthermore, increasing the power levels and 
at the same time reducing the size of microwave weapon systems is technically 
challenging, and does not seem feasible for the next few years.120  
Another important weakness of high-power microwave weapons is that they emit 
a very distinctive electronic signature that might be detected from great distances. Thus, 
high-powered electromagnetic radiation emitted by the microwave weapons makes them 
susceptible to attacks by anti-radiation missiles, which use the radiation from the source 
systems for guidance.121 
Table 9 and Table 10 show the advantages and disadvantages of laser weapons 












                                                 
119 Atmospheric breakdown occurs at very high power levels when microwave energy creates plasma 
in the air that prevents the microwaves from propagation. 
120 Sweetman 2006. 
121 National Air Intelligence Center Wright-Patterson AFB Oh and Zhihao 1996, 5) 
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Laser Weapon Advantages HPM Weapon Advantages 
Effective against maneuvering and  
fast targets  
All-weather attack  
(Insensitivity to weather) 
Effective against material Area coverage of multiple targets 
Long range engagement Enhance target entryways 
Precise  targeting  Harder to defense against  
Visual damage assessment Many possible targets 
Minimum collateral damage 
Old and advanced technology   
Simplified pointing and tracking  
Attack at the speed of light 
Graduated effect capability (non-lethal to lethal) 
Low cost per shot 
Minimum collateral damage 



































Unlimited magazine  




Laser Weapon Disadvantages HPM Weapon Disadvantages 
Atmospheric and weather dependence Atmospheric breakdown  
Easier material and tactical 
countermeasures Difficult damage assessment  
Engage one target at a time Distinctive electronic signature 
Expensive concepts (SBL) Fratricide  
Line-of-sight vision Large visual signature 
Source pinpointing Technical challenges 









































Relatively new technologies 
Table 10.   Comparison of Laser and HPM Weapon Systems Disadvantages 
 
There is not a weapon that exists without limitations and constraints due to 
environmental or tactical conditions. Like any weapon system in the real world, directed-
energy weapons have constraints and disadvantages.  
Despite their differences, directed-energy weapons  
• Are unaffected by gravity, 
• Are capable of graduated effects, 
• Cause minimal collateral damage, 
• Have deep magazines, 
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• Low cost per shot, 
• Moreover, they most importantly attack at the speed of light.122  
They are complementary to each other and because of this, they have distinct 
advantages over other weapon systems and are ready for the next war or conflict.  
                                                 
122 Beason 2005, 58. 
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VI. PRESENT AND NEAR FUTURE DIRECTED-ENERGY 
WEAPONS 
A. E-BOMBS  
Electromagnetic bombs or E-bombs, described as the “nuclear weapons of the 
information age”, are devices specifically designed to destroy a wide range of electronic 
equipment over their footprints.123 E-bombs produce high voltage standing waves on 
wiring and cables or cause secondary radiation of an intense electromagnetic blast at the 
gigahertz level which is strong enough to melt electrical circuitry.  
The basic principle of an E-bomb entails the use of an explosive magnetic flux 
compression generator. Essentially, a magnetic armature is driven by explosives through 
a coil, energized by a bank of capacitors, and the resulting energy is directed through an 
antenna.124 Figure 19 shows the hypothetical design for an E-bomb warhead in which a 
two-stage flux compression generator provides gigawatts of power to the virtual cathode 
oscillator (vircator), which produces the high-power microwaves.125 
 
 
Figure 19.   E-bomb Warhead126  
                                                 
123 Kopp 1996. 
124 Sweetman 2006. 
125 Abrams 2003, 29. 
126  From Ibid. 
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Electromagnetic bombs could be delivered by a cruise missile, unmanned air 
vehicle (UAV) or conventional aircraft as an aerial bomb. Improving the lethality of an 
electromagnetic bomb might be achieved through several means: 
• Increasing bomb output energy 
• Maximizing the duration of operation  
• Minimizing losses incurred inside the bomb 
• Achieving the best possible coupling efficiency 
• Initiating the weapon at lower altitude127 (Figure 20) 
 
 
Figure 20.   Lethal Footprint of an E-bomb128 
 
Countries known to have studied E-bombs are the United States, Germany, 
Russia, France and the United Kingdom.129 
 
                                                 
127 Kopp 1996. 
128 From Abrams 2003, 29. 
129 Sweetman 2006. 
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B. ACTIVE DENIAL SYSTEM (USA) 
The Active Denial System (ADS), which is known as the pain ray, is a non-lethal 
directed-energy weapon used against human targets. It uses the millimeter-wave region of 
the electromagnetic spectrum, which penetrates shallowly into a conducting surface like 
human skin. The ADS uses a 95 GHz radar beam that penetrates 0.4 to 0.5 mm into 
human skin. 130 
ADS produces a heat sensation that within seconds becomes intolerable and 
forces the targeted individual to instinctively flee. The sensation immediately ceases 
when the individual moves out of the beam or when the operator turns off the system.131  
Since the produced pulses are very short and targeted humans react instinctively, ADS 
does not cause permanent injury.  
ADS (Figure 21) could be used for protection of defense resources, peacekeeping, 
humanitarian missions and other situations in which the use of lethal force is undesirable. 
The system is described as having a range of 700 yards.132 
 
 
Figure 21.   Vehicle-mounted Active Denial System (V-MADS)133 
                                                 
130 Scannell 2003, 8. 
131 Anonymous 2006. 
132 Anonymous 2007. 
133 From Anonymous 2006. 
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C. ZEUS (USA) 
Zeus is a high-energy laser system that is capable of neutralizing surface-laid 
mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) such as artillery rounds, mortar rounds, rifle 
grenades, and large general-purpose bombs (Figure 22).134 The system, which was 
integrated on a high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), was developed 
by the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command. 
The Zeus system uses high-energy laser to warm the outer surface of the target to 
neutralize it at ranges up to 250 to 300 meters.  The system is able to engage only the 
targets which are in a clear line of sight, not buried threats. Its dwell time depends on the 
thickness of the target outer surface. Unlike other mine-clearance systems, the Zeus 
system causes only low-level detonations, which mitigates flying fragments and damage 
to roads and supply routes needed by friendly forces.135 
 
 
Figure 22.   Zeus System136 
                                                 
134 Defense Science Board Washington DC 2001, 83. 
135 Sirak 2002. 
136 From Defense Science Board Washington DC 2001, 83. 
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Zeus is controlled by a driver and laser operator, and has the ability to search an 
area and store all targeting coordinates onto a global positioning system-aided map before 
destroying the mines.137 The Zeus system consists of seven subsystems as illustrated in 
Figure 23: 
• Fire control subsystem 
• Laser device subsystem (LDS) 
• Laser power subsystem (LPS) 
• Prime power subsystem 
• Beam control system (BCS) 
• Waste heat subsystem 
• Armored vehicle subsystem 138 
 
 





                                                 
137 Sirak 2002. 
138 Defense Science Board Washington DC 2001, 84. 
139 From Ibid, 85. 
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D. VIGILANT EAGLE (USA) 
Vigilant Eagle is a ground based high-power microwave weapon system which 
functions like modern radar systems to protect arriving and departing aircraft from an 
airport. It is an alternative or complement to installing infrared countermeasures on the 
aircraft themselves as a defense against shoulder-fired missiles or man-portable air 
defense systems (MANPADS) during the landing and takeoff phases of flight.  
Vigilant Eagle works with four or five overlapping missile warning systems 
(MWS), which consist of infrared detectors mounted on cell phone towers, buildings and 
other common structures around an airport as camouflage. These distributed infrared 
sensors identify and track a missile and pass the triangulated data to a Command and 
Control (C2) segment. Once the target data is nominated by C2, commands are sent to the 
high power array transmitter (HAT) to focus a disruptive beam on the missile to disrupt 
the missile circuits and divert it away from the target aircraft (Figure 24).140 141 The 
power level, frequency and waveform of the Vigilant Eagle system have been selected so 
as not to interfere with aircraft systems in the event that the high-power amplifier 
transmitter (HAT) illuminates a friendly aircraft.142 
 
 
Figure 24.   Vigilant Eagle System143 
                                                 
140 Fulghum 2005, 2. 
141 Vollin, Jeff 2006, 4. 
142 Sweetman 2006. 
143 From Fulghum 2005. 
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E. STINGRAY (USA) 
The Stingray is a tactical laser system integrated into Bradley Fighting Vehicles 
and designed to detect and defeat threats with direct fire control systems (Figure 25).144 
The Stingray uses low-energy laser weapons to detect and counter multiple enemy 
electro-optic systems and fire-control equipment before the weapons can be fired.145 The 
system sends and then picks up reflected laser light - which is called the cat-eye effect - 
from the enemy optical equipment and sensors in order to lock onto target systems.  
 
 
Figure 25.   AN/VLQ-7 Stingray146 
 
The Stingray can operate in automatic, semiautomatic, or manual modes 
depending on the control measures required to protect friendly forces. To obtain the 
maximum effect on enemy systems: 
• The automatic mode is used when there is no danger to friendly forces and 
when there are large number of enemy systems 
• The semiautomatic mode is used when more restrictive control measures 
are required 
                                                 
144 Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 31. 
145 Campbell 2000. 
146 From Anonymous 2000. 
 84
• The manual mode is used for security reasons when tight control of the 
system is required because of command restrictions or restrictions on laser 
operations.147 
F. SABER 203 (USA) 
The Saber 203 is a type of laser weapon that was designed to impair the vision of 
enemy soldiers when fired from a standard 40-mm M-203 grenade launcher attached to 
the M-16 rifle.148  This weapon system uses a semiconductor laser and its effective range 
is around 300 meters (Figure 26).  
 
 
Figure 26.   Saber 203149 
 
The Saber 203 system has the following two parts: 
• A metal capsule, which is about the size and shape of a 40 millimeter 
grenade that houses the laser emitter and will load into the launcher as if it 
is an actual grenade. 
• A battery pack, which is snapped on to the weapon’s underside and a 
button on the battery pack fires the laser in a continuous or pulsed beam to 
illuminate a target.150 
                                                 
147 Anonymous 2000. 
148 Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 31. 
149  From Anonymous 2006. 
150  Ibid. 
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The Saber 203 can be used to temporarily impair the vision of enemy soldiers or 
to alert or realize that they have been targeted.  
G. ZM-87 PORTABLE LASER (CHINA) 
ZM-87 is a portable laser weapon designed to damage electro-optical sensors such 
as laser rangefinders, video cameras and missile seeker heads at ranges up to 10 km.151 
The weapon affects its targets by transmitting 15 MW laser pulses at two different 
wavelengths simultaneously with a 5 Hz repetition rate. It weighs less than 35 kilograms 
(Figure 27).152  
 
Figure 27.   ZM-87 Portable Laser153 
 
H. BRILLIANT (CANADA) 
Beam Rider Laser Localization Imaging and Neutralization Tracker 
(BRILLIANT) is a directed laser countermeasure weapon which is effective against laser 
guided weapon systems. Basically, BRILLIANT (Figure 28) consists of five units:  
• A laser detection unit, which is covering 360 degrees and feeds the code 
breaker 
                                                 
151  Anonymous 2007. 
152  Anonymous 1995. 
153  From Ibid. 
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• A code breaker, which analyses the inputs from the detection unit and 
triggers the gate of a video camera 
• An imaging and localization device, which drives the video tracker 
• A video tracker, which allows centering of the target in the camera field of 
view and provides precise localization of the threat 
•  A directed counter measure laser, with an eye-safe green laser mounted 
on top of the camera154  
 
 
Figure 28.   BRILLIANT System155 
 
I. PERSONNEL HALTING AND SIMULATION RESPONSE (USA) 
The Personnel Halting and Stimulation Response (PHaSR) is a first of its kind 
rifle-sized laser weapon system that can be operated by a single shooter. The PHaSR 
system uses laser light to illuminates or dazzle aggressors that temporarily impairs the 
vision of hostile individuals.156 
 
                                                 
154 Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (Ontario) et al. 2004, 32. 
155 From Ibid, 33. 
156 Anonymous 2006. 
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The PHaSR is about the same size and weight of a fully-loaded M60 machine 
gun, 9 kg, but shoots a low-powered beam of laser light rather than bullets. By 
incorporating the laser rangefinder, PHaSR can target an individual, determine his or her 
distance from the person holding the PHaSR, and then automatically adjust the laser 
power level. Possible applications of the PHaSR include non-lethal fire for controlling 
crowds and protecting areas such as checkpoints.157  
 
 
Figure 29.   The Personnel Halting and Stimulation Response (PHaSR)158 
 
 
                                                 
157 Sirak 2005. 
158 From Anonymous 2006. 
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VII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS 
FOR THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES 
Peace at home, peace in the world. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
The founder and the first president of the Turkish Republic 
 
Directed-energy weapons offer the potential for the most dramatic transformation 
of modern militaries since the advent of electronics and possibly even gunpowder. The 
deployment of these kinds of unique weapon systems with extremely long ranges, speed-
of-light engagement, deep magazines, area coverage, surgical strike ability, and minimum 
collateral damage would naturally revolutionize the way military forces are equipped, 
organized, supplied and operated.159 
It is obvious that technology may allow nations to gain a decisive advantage over 
their enemies and protect their forces on the battlefield. Military operations will be 
different and revolutionary in a directed-energy environment. Under this reality, directed-
energy weapons will clearly be a force multiplier and provide revolutionary combat 
capabilities to the Turkish Armed Forces. Due to this reason, the Turkish Armed Forces 
should prepare itself to deal with this circumstance.  
As written in the previous chapters, several nations have started to make 
investments to develop and field directed-energy weapons, and countries who 
underestimate the features of these weapon systems will be susceptible against these 
nations in the event of unwanted conflicts. Directed-energy weapons clearly offer some 
novel and potentially very important offensive and defensive missions and concepts and 
may become more than a force multiplier for the Turkish Armed Forces.  
 
 
                                                 
159 Thompson and Goure 2003, 33. 
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A. WHY SHOULD THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES INTEGRATE DEW  
The Turkish Armed Forces’ missions and responsibilities are clearly stated in the 
Turkish Constitution and determined by law. In this context, the small but flexible units, 
having sufficient capability equipped with technological weapons and systems, 
comprising sufficient command-control assets, precise and developed ammunition, 
covering early warning assets and also able to conduct operation in any weather 
condition, are very desirable and take priority in the new approach.160 
1. Support All Levels of War  
The challenge to the Turkish Armed Forces is to define a vision and a doctrine of 
directed-energy weapons and determine how it can best integrate and implement DEW 
systems into current war levels. The benefits of this integration might lead to more 
effective offensive and defensive strategies for the Turkish Armed Forces. Directed-
energy weapons are capable of creating effects across tactical, operational, and strategic, 
levels of war. 
• Tactical level of war: The level of war at which battles and engagements 
are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to 
tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered 
arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other 
and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives (Joint Publication 1-02, 
161).  
• Operational level of war: The level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic 
objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level 
link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to 
accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the 
operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring 
about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension 
of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative 
support of tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical 
successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives (Joint Publication 1-
02, 161).  
• Strategic level of war: The level of war at which a nation, often as a 
member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational 
                                                 
160 Turkish General Staff 2007. 
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(alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and 
uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this 
level establish national and multinational military objectives, sequence 
initiatives, define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other 
instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to 
achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities 
in accordance with strategic plans (Joint Publication 1-02, 161).  
Directed-energy weapons will be the newest technology and weapon systems in 
the twenty-first century. Tactically, directed-energy weapons that deliver lethal force 
against a target instantaneously will provide new killing mechanisms for the Turkish 
Armed Forces. Since the range and magazine of directed-energy weapons are greater than 
kinetic energy weapons, these weapons will enhance the combat capability of small and 
flexible tactical Turkish units. As a result, tactical troops equipped with directed-energy 
weapons, such as low-energy and medium-energy laser weapons, mobile tactical high-
energy laser (MTHEL) weapons and compact high-power microwave weapons loaded on 
unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV), are likely to be more capable than the troops 
equipped with traditional weapons systems.  
The operational level focuses on a large piece of the battlefield and connects the 
other two levels of war. Any weapon affecting operational doctrine and operational 
command and control systems will be effective at this level. Airborne laser (ABL) 
weapons, tactical high-energy laser (THEL) weapons and high-power microwave bombs 
(E-bombs) may be useful at this level of war.  
At a strategic level of war, increased interaction between Turkish troops and 
friendly troops, or even hostile civilian populations especially in urban warfare, will play 
important roles. Active Denial non-lethal directed-energy weapons could help Turkish 
Tasked Forces undertaking peacekeeping missions and joint operations with its allies. 
This will minimize the need to rely on lethal weapons for crowd control and fratricide 
against allied forces. In addition, high-power microwave bombs (E-bombs), which 
produce negligible collateral damage when compared with conventional explosive 
munitions, allow the administration of effective strategic strike operations against buried 
targets or targets that are located in civilian populated areas. 
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2. Homeland Defense 
Use of directed-energy weapons might alter current and future defense concepts 
of the Turkish Armed Forces. Stationary and mobile directed-energy weapons, which 
deliver their lethality at the speed of light, might also decrease defensive reaction time 
against fast moving and maneuvering multiple targets such as artillery, fighter aircraft, 
and long-range ballistic missiles that threaten the Turkish borders.  
Because of Turkey’s geostrategic position, the Turkish Armed Forces might need 
weapon systems that react fast and engage rapidly against multiple targets. With their 
deep magazine, directed-energy weapons might give both area coverage and precise 
accuracy to prevent hostile attacks on the Turkish borders for homeland defense. This 
will enable the Turkish Armed Forces to develop highly effective offensive capabilities to 
protect its warfighters on the ground, in the air, and at sea. 
3. Effective Domestic Security 
Directed-energy weapons provide instantaneous target engagement and 
discriminatory firepower with high accuracy even when used in urban environments. 
Using this new technology is critical to defense of national domestic entities.   
Since directed-energy weapons demonstrate tremendous potential against rockets 
and missile threats, the Turkish Armed Forces can use them against these threats. These 
electromagnetic swords might be considered to provide an adequate, credible security 
zone around domestic targets such as Turkey’s critical infrastructures (government 
buildings, major transportation nodes, telecommunication facilities, power plants) and 
important military bases. In addition to their precision and instantaneous reaction 
capability, such defense systems might also be cost efficient and safe.  
4. Low Operational Cost 
Some types of directed-energy weapons might be able to intercept targets at lower 
cost than conventional munitions in current use by the Turkish Armed Forces. Although 
directed-energy weapons require major investments to build and develop, costs after 
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these stages might be minimal because these weapons systems expend only energy. For 
example, in the case of a defense against short-range and long-range missiles, shots from 
directed-energy weapons might cost around $8,000, whereas kinetic energy missiles cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars or even millions of dollars, depending on their types. 
Moreover, unlike currently used conventional weapon systems, directed-energy weapons 
might simplify logistics. Since fuel is their only expendable to produce energy and they 
do not require a large logistical tail, they might save money and time for the Turkish 
Armed Forces as well. Table 11 provides examples of some typical missile costs. 
 
System  Nomenclature FISCAL YEAR 2007 Unit Cost  ($M) 
AMRAAM AIM-120-A-C 0.643 
ATACMS MGM-140B 1.407 
BDM XM-141 0.009 
ESSM RIM-162A 0.922 
GMLRS   0.216 
HELLFIRE II AGM-114K 0.096 
JASSM AGM-158A 0.8 
JAVELIN   0.145 
JDAM  GBU-31/32 0.022 
PAC-3   4.529 
RAM RIM-116A 0.632 
SDB GBU-39/B 0.074 
SIDEWINNER AIM-9X 0.231 
SLAMRAAM   1.467 
TACTICAL 









WCMD   0.139 
Table 11.   Missile Costs161 
                                                 
161 From Nicholas and Rossi 2006. 
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5. Superior Information Warfare 
Modern warfare totally depends on communication and information operations. 
Directed-energy weapons might give the Turkish Armed Forces the capability to limit its 
enemy’s ability to control and command their military forces. In this context, high-power 
microwave weapons might be extremely effective against enemy communication and 
electronic systems (Figure 30). 
Turkish Armed Forces could use directed-energy weapons to attack and disable 
enemy ground and air control systems, communication facilities, radars, and ground 
defense systems. Furthermore, directed-energy weapons can be used to attack enemy 
commercial radio and television stations to limit their information network capabilities.  
 
 
Figure 30.   Damage and Destroy Enemy Information Systems162  
 
6. Non-lethal Warfare 
• Non-lethal weapons: Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily 
employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing 
fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to 
property and the environment. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that 
destroy their targets through blasts, penetration, and fragmentation, non-
lethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to 
prevent the target from functioning (Joint Publication 1-02, 161). 
                                                 
162 From Anonymous 2003. 
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Directed-energy weapons might enable entirely new concepts of operation for 
“non-lethal warfare” for the Turkish Armed Forces. This new way of war does not cause 
physical destruction while striking against high-value enemy targets (communication 
systems, critical industries) and critical military targets, which may be located in 
populated areas, urban centers or even buried locations. Directed-energy weapons can 
strike such targets with little to no collateral damage when conventional weapons would 
not be feasible due to the risk to the public. 
Since the Turkish Armed Forces has always attached great importance to 
peacekeeping missions and serving the needs of maintaining peace throughout the world, 
interaction between friendly troops, civilian groups and Turkish soldiers are ever 
increasing. Equipping Turkish peacekeeping forces with effective non-lethal weapons 
might be beneficial in urban environments, especially in peacekeeping activities, to 
minimize damage to property and personal injury.  
Similarly, Turkish law enforcement units and the Coast Guard can use this 
capacity of non-lethal directed-energy weapons as a countermeasure against criminal 
equipment and materials. These law enforcement troops can utilize non-lethal directed-
energy weapons to disable and stop the criminal land, sea and air vehicles as well as 
criminal human targets without the hazards to the public associated with small firearms. 
Due to their non-lethal to lethal graduated effect properties, directed-energy weapons 
might provide a valuable tool in law enforcement for Turkey.  
In summary, because of their unique advantages, directed-energy weapons might 
offer the Turkish Armed Forces the capability to maintain an asymmetric technological 
advantage over its adversaries during the twenty-first century. 
B. HOW DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS BENEFIT TURKISH LAND 
FORCES 
Directed-energy weapons might be able to change the existing capabilities of the 
Turkish Land Forces and extends these capabilities both defensively and offensively. A 
Turkish Armed Force equipped with unique directed-energy weapons might offer a new 
way of war beyond those nations equipped with modern kinetic energy weapons.  
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Communications and command systems are key elements in land warfare, and 
their essence is to permit forces to gain situational awareness. Due to this key element, 
C4ISR systems and units are one of the first targets attacked so as to limit the enemy 
military forces’ operations. The Turkish Armed Forces could use effective directed-
energy weapons to attack an enemy’s C4ISR systems and defeat one element of the 
enemy’s center of gravity. A useful strategy with directed-energy weapons might be an 
initial attack with high-power microwave payloads to create a maximum dislocation and 
disruption of enemy C4ISR systems and then a follow-up attack with precise laser 
weapons and traditional conventional munitions. 
Integrating directed-energy weapons into the current land warfare doctrine might 
also increase the precision and volume of the Turkish Land Forces’ fire in complex 
environments. Furthermore, directed-energy weapons used by the Turkish Army might 
provide a non-lethal kill of a wide range of targets with non-destructive strikes. As seen 
from the latest land warfare underway worldwide, the probability of fighting in urban 
areas is increasing. Since civilian involvement and collateral damage is also increasing, 
conventional weapons might be hard to use in this environment. Against this complexity 
of fighting in urban areas, different structures of precise and tunable directed-energy 
weapons might be a new force multiplier that broadens the range of military options for 
the Turkish Land Forces.  
Increased lethality at sufficient ranges and area coverage (or rapid targeting) are 
other important factors that might affect land warfare in this century. Directed-energy 
weapons, which give adjustable lethal power and can strike their targets with almost no 
time delay, might give this lethality to the Turkish Land Forces. Area coverage of high-
power microwaves or rapid targeting of laser weapons is also an effective application of 
directed-energy weapons to meet the Turkish Land Forces’ requirement for an active air 
defense against rockets, artillery and mortars (RAM), which are extremely fast and have 
a short time of flight. Figure 31 visualizes the defense against rockets, artillery and 




Figure 31.   Defense against RAM163 
 
Stealthiness of high-power microwave weapons might provide physiological and 
technological superiority to the Turkish Land Forces. During low-intensity conflicts or 
even in major conflicts, defeating the enemy’s will to fight without allowing an adversary 
to know he is under attack would be an advantage for the Turkish Army.  
Directed-energy-equipped helicopters or unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) 
could provide close air support for the Turkish Army. In this capacity, high-power 
microwave-equipped air platforms might target critical command, control, and 
communication (C3) capabilities, sensors and weapon guidance systems.  
Reasonable applications of directed-energy weapons for the Turkish Land Forces 
are given in Table 12. 
 
                                                 
163 From Anonymous 2006. 
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• Attack against pop-up targets (tanks, helicopters, UAVs, aircraft)  
• Anti-personnel  
• Close air support for ground forces 
• Controlling riots or hostile civilian crowds 
• Counter rockets, artillery and mortars (RAM) 
• Counter command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) missions 
• Air defense of important military bases and high value targets 
• Mine detection and detonation 
• Protection of armored vehicles 
 
Table 12.   Land Applications of DE Weapons 
 
The Turkish Army will remain a vital component in the Turkish national strategy 
and when complimented with directed-energy weapons, equipped Turkish Land Forces 
would maintain a decisive advantage over forces of other nations who neglect the 
importance of these twenty-first century weapon systems. 
C. HOW DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS BENEFIT TURKISH NAVAL 
FORCES 
Since Turkey is surrounded on three sides by water, seapower will always be 
critical to the success of its national security. Modernization and being equipped with 
directed-energy weapons might change the Turkish Naval Forces’ ability to execute its 
missions.  
Today, some of the possible threats that naval forces might encounter in either the 
deep water or the littoral battle space are: 
• Aircraft attack 
• Ship-based or land-based helicopters 
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• Ship-based or land-based UAVs  
• Ship-launched or submarine-launched anti-ship missiles (ASM)  
• Surface ship gunfire  
• Torpedoes 
• Mines164 
Due to their sophisticated attack capacity, the greatest threat to the Turkish Naval 
Forces is probably anti-ship missiles (ASMs). Additionally, mines and torpedo threats are 
relatively inexpensive weapons against expensive naval platforms. These threats are 
followed by low-observable stealth aircraft and ships. In addition to these threats, the 
most susceptible segments of the naval order of battle are high-technology 
communication, sensor, and navigation systems.  
Ships are large relatively slow-moving platforms, making them easy targets 
against missile threats. Although missiles are very effective against sea targets, they 
require extremely fast control systems to avoid flying into the water even in relatively 
benign weather. Thus, even a minor disturbance of the missile’s radar altimeter or 
guidance software could be sufficient to create a “hard-kill” if the missile hits the surface 
of the sea.165 Area coverage, precise targeting, and rapid engagement with different 
targets are properties of directed-energy weapons that might address this missile threat 
for the Turkish Navy. Against the increased speed and maneuvering capabilities of these 
missiles, the Turkish Navy can benefit from the speed advantage of directed-energy 
weapons to minimize the risk of missile attacks. Figure 32 visualizes the ship defense 
against anti-ship missiles (ASM).  
 
                                                 
164 (Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2004. 
165 Air University Press Maxwell AFB AL and McCarthy 2000, 31. 
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Figure 32.   Ship Defense Against ASMs 166 
 
Furthermore, directed-energy weapons might provide enhanced protection against 
low-speed slow flying air vehicles for the Turkish Navy. Effective defense with directed-
energy weapons against the sensor and complicated avionic systems of these air targets 
might disrupt and degrade their digital flight control, target acquisition, target tracking, 
command and control, and weapon systems, and therefore protect valuable literal assets 
of the Turkish Navy. 
In addition to defense against slow targets, the Turkish Navy might use directed-
energy weapons against pop-up targets such as small speedboats, patrol boats or 
helicopters. Rapid response and precise targeting of directed-energy weapons might also 
be effective against these fast maneuvering and suddenly appearing targets.  
There is a theoretical possibility that a laser director-tracker could be used to 
detect and destroy submarine periscope sensors.167 Although this concept is not practical 
with current technologies, in later years Turkish Naval Forces might use directed-energy 
weapons against enemy submarine threats.  
                                                 
166 From Kalfoutzos 2002. 
167 Air University Press Maxwell AFB AL and McCarthy 2000, 38. 
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Turkish Naval Forces might utilize directed-energy weapons against enemy 
surveillance, communication and fleet navigation systems. As written before, these 
highly complicated electro-optic systems are very susceptible to high-power microwave 
attacks. The Turkish Navy might use directed-energy weapons to destroy and disrupt 
these electronic systems. 
Another unique advantage that directed-energy weapons might provide to the 
Turkish Navy is the bottomless magazine. Not only are sea platforms large enough to 
install directed-energy weapons, but they also have no power limitation to support 
directed-energy weapons. This feature might eliminate the need to reload and reduce the 
logistic tail of the Turkish Naval Forces. 
There are several ways that the Turkish Naval Forces might use direct-energy 
weapons to defend its fleet as written below in Table 13.  
 
• Fleet defense against missile threats 
• Counter to low- and slow-flying air vehicles 
• Counter to pop-up targets 
• Attack submarines 
• Attack enemy surveillance, communication, navigation and weapon systems 
Table 13.   Naval Applications of DE Weapons 
 
In regards to the maritime environment, directed-energy weapon types might have 
some limitations, such as the short range of high-power microwaves and weather 
sensitivity of laser weapons. However, directed-energy weapons provide extraordinary 
advantages to the Turkish Naval Forces as long as their inherit limitations are well 
understood. A combination of both directed-energy weapons and conventional weapons 
might enhance the war fighting capability of the Turkish Navy.  
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D. HOW DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS BENEFITS THE TURKISH AIR 
FORCE 
Applications of the directed-energy weapons might have major impacts on the 
Turkish Air Force. These impacts might be profound in both the air-to-air battle and the 
air-to-ground battle.  
Self-protection of Turkish aircraft against their deadliest significant threat, 
surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, might be the most important employment of 
directed-energy weapons for the Turkish Air Force. As written in previous chapters, 
missile systems use different types of sensitive sensors that include infrared, radio 
frequency, laser or a combination for guidance. The Turkish Air Force might use 
directed-energy weapons to defend against these threats and disable the guidance and 
control functions of approaching missiles (Figure 33). 
At present, the limiting factor in air-to-air engagements is the number of missiles 
an aircraft can carry.168 Instead of having a limited payload, directed-energy weapon-
equipped Turkish fighter aircraft might be effective against numerous thin-skinned air 
targets. DEW-equipped fighter aircraft might be used against the electronic equipment of 
hard ground targets such as tanks and armored personnel carriers. 
 
 
Figure 33.   Self-protection of Fighter Aircraft169 
                                                 
168 Thompson and Goure 2003, 31. 
169 From Anonymous 2005. 
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This advanced air-to-ground ability of the Turkish Air Force might be particularly 
valuable for close-air support and offensive counter-air missions that involve attacks on 
an enemy’s fuel supplies, ammunition storage areas and aircraft on the ground.170 In 
addition, the Turkish Air Force might use directed-energy-equipped aircraft against 
enemy C4ISR systems to interdict these assets. 
Air defenses are extremely intensive users of electronics for ISR, command, 
control and communications and targeting. Due to this feature, they are highly vulnerable 
to even minor electronic attacks. To ensure air supremacy, the Turkish Air Force might 
use directed-energy weapons in the suppression of enemy air defense systems, to include 
tracking radars, targeting radars, communications and missile guidance, control and 
intercept functions that are necessary for locating, tracking, targeting, and attacking 
friendly aircraft.171 
Furthermore, the low cost per-shot feature of directed-energy weapons might be 
an advantage for the training of Turkish pilots.  Unlike expensive aircraft munitions, 
directed-energy weapons would take their source power from the aircraft’s electronic 
supply. According to their training concept, Turkish fighters might utilize this feature of 
directed-energy weapons on their fighter lead-in training.  
Defensive and offensive capabilities of directed-energy weapons for the Turkish 







                                                 
170 Thompson and Goure 2003, 28. 
171 Air Univ Press Maxwell AFB AL and Walling 2000, 16. 
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• Aircraft self-protection 
• Air-to-air and air-to-ground attack 
• Close air-support 
• Air interdiction of C4ISR systems 
• Suppression of enemy air defense 
• Low cost for pilot training 
Table 14.   Air Applications of DE Weapons 
 
As presented in Chapter II, many nations are making the investment to develop 
and produce directed-energy weapons. While directed-energy weapons are not yet 
mature, they are posing increasing capabilities for strategic, operational and tactical 
levels of war. Therefore, it is time to make a commitment if the Turkish Armed Forces 
are to take advantage of this revolution in weaponry. It is time to place increased 
emphasis on the research and development of the value added by these emerging 
revolutionary weapon systems. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Victory is for those who can say "Victory is mine". Success is for those 
who can begin saying "I will succeed" and say "I have succeeded" in the 
end.  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
The founder and the first president of the Turkish Republic 
 
After remarkable advancements in the past few decades, the revolutionary 
concept of directed-energy weapons has matured in many areas to the point that they are 
ready to be implemented by a country’s military services as the twenty-first century’s 
most challenging weapon systems, either in offensive or defensive applications. These 
revolutionary weapon systems offer asymmetric military advantages over adversaries that 
fail to take into consideration the application of future directed-energy weapons. 
As explained in this thesis, directed-energy weapons, both high power-microwave 
weapons and laser weapons, are complementary to each other and have distinct 
advantages over traditional kinetic and chemical energy weapons. These inherent 
advantages include the ability to travel at the speed of light, delivery precision and 
discrimination of power, deep magazine capacity, low cost per shot, rapid and multiple 
target engagement, and non-lethal operations capability.  
Engineering research continues to overcome various challenges to bring these 
weapons to the battlefield. These challenges include the need to reduce the cost, decrease 
the size and increase the power of directed-energy weapons, such as the high-energy 
laser. However, it is likely that directed-energy systems will continue to be developed for 
military applications, and in the near future nations will implement these weapon systems 
in compact sizes and will integrate them into small combat platforms or even man-
portable systems.  
The Turkish Armed Forces is likely to remain committed to the development and 
deployment of technologically advanced and modernized armed forces to be ready to face 
the uncertainties of future combat. In this context, the unique features of directed-energy 
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weapons will clearly be a force multiplier and provide opportunities to improve the 
Turkish Armed Forces’ operational capabilities in a variety of mission areas. The 
advantages of directed-energy weapons, as explained in this thesis, might become 
exceptionally important as the Turkish Armed Forces moves to smaller and more 
professional combat units. On the other hand, failure to develop and understand directed-
energy weapon systems might threaten the Turkish Armed Forces with an unknown 
battlefield and weaken its military power and war-fighting ability.  
Furthermore, the Turkish Armed Forces might need to look into technological 
countermeasures against the effects of directed-energy weapons on the battlefield before 
facing an adversary equipped with these weapon systems.  
This thesis concludes with several recommendations for the Turkish Armed 
Forces as it considers the possibility of integration of directed-energy weapons into its 
military force structure. 
• Technological superiority gained by these weapons might give the Turkish 
Armed Forces new capabilities to cope with threats in its geostrategic 
position. This superiority might be attained by investing and focusing on 
directed-energy weapons. 
• Drawing from recent peacekeeping missions and experiences, interaction 
between friendly troops, civilian groups and Turkish soldiers are 
increasing. Equipping Turkish peacekeeping forces with effective non-
lethal directed-energy weapons might be beneficial in urban environments 
to minimize property and personnel injury to non-combatants and friendly 
forces.  
• Against highly technologically armed forces that heavily depend upon 
information and equipped with stealth aircraft and sophisticated missile 
systems, Turkish Armed Forces could use the asymmetric advantages of 
directed-energy weapons to gain and maintain control of the battlefield.  
• With proper cost-effective investments, participation of the national 
universities and national scientific research institutes, Turkey could 
establish a joint directed-energy organization to research directed-energy 
weapons. This organization might have overall responsibility for the 
engineering and manufacturing stages of these weapons, which would help 
to accelerate the advancements in directed-energy technology. In addition, 
this unit might collaborate with other friendly nations’ military and 
civilian departments, which are conducting technological investigations 
related to directed-energy weapons, so as to share and transfer laser and 
microwave technologies. 
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• In regards to the types of laser technology, airborne and space-based HEL 
are inherently expensive and require too much investment at present to 
achieve significant development. In addition, they require large platforms 
and consume large amounts of power. Their key elements, such as 
cooling, target acquisition, aiming and tracking, and fire control systems, 
are expensive to manufacture and cumbersome to maintain. For these 
reasons, the Turkish Armed Forces might concentrate on low-energy or 
medium-energy man-portable laser systems and tactical high-energy laser 
weapons and rely on their allies to develop ABL and SBL systems, 
especially those more suited to regional or large area defense. As 
established earlier in this thesis, nations such as the United States, a close 
ally, have been conducing research and testing for some time on such 
systems, and Turkey would reasonably expect to benefit from this research 
and development. 
• Active denial system (ADS) is probably the most mature directed-energy 
system available. Since tunable high-power microwaves like ADS reduce 
the risks associated with collateral damage, provide attack at the speed of 
light, give adjustable damage capacity and low operational cost, and 
reduce logistic support, they might be pursued by the Turkish Armed 
Forces. In addition to HPM systems, the Turkish Armed Forces might 
concentrate on transient electromagnetic devices that produce a single 
spike of energy and radiate electrostatic discharge. These devices are 
relatively small in size and much lower in average power and cost.  
• Since directed-energy weapons are relatively new systems, there is little 
training information for front-line troops. The Turkish Armed Forces, 
however, might understand how directed-energy weapons affect their 
targets and conceptualize the effect of these weapons upon other systems 
and troops. The Turkish Armed Forces might organize a comprehensive 
program among its branches to educate and train trainers on the concept of 
directed-energy weapons and publish introductory training films on 
directed-energy weapons. These training programs would help Turkish 
soldiers to prepare for their first encounters with these formidable 
weapons on the battlefield. 
• The Turkish Armed Forces should consider development of a doctrine to 
fight in a directed-energy environment. This would develop and maximize 
the effects of tactics and training against directed-energy weapons. 
Furthermore, this new doctrine would increase the survivability and 
recoverability of the Turkish Armed Forces against directed-energy 
warfare.  
• In order to have effective countermeasures against directed-energy 
weapons systems, the Turkish Armed Forces needs to expand its research 
and development programs on hardening techniques against these systems, 
and start to apply these programs to high-value nationwide assets with 
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proper planning. Concentrating on the development of tactical 
countermeasure against directed-energy weapons is appropriate for the 
Turkish Armed Forces.  
In conclusion, directed-energy weapons are neither simple nor inexpensive 
systems, but their utility might be well worth the cost and research to ensure the security 
of Turkey against internal and external risks as well as the contribution to regional and 
global peace. Directed-energy weapons will one day be a key feature of the future 
structure of the Turkish Armed Forces and their war-fighting capability. The sooner the 
nation begins to prepare for this eventuality, the safer Turkey will be against internal and 
external threats to its security and well-being. 
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